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This thesis explores variation in attitudes towards the EU among Scandinavians’ through a 
value-theoretical lens. Using Norwegian, Swedish and Danish data from eight rounds of the 
European Social Survey, a set of linear regression analyses were performed to examine the 
effects of 1) Conservation, 2) Openness to change, 3) Self-transcendence and 4) Self-
enhancement values on support for European integration and trust in the European Parliament. 
In addition to providing a thorough review of the current state of research on political and 
psychological concepts such as attitudes, the link between attitudes and values and key 
determinants attitudes towards the EU, the overarching goal of this thesis has been to apply the 
insights provided by social and political psychology to the domain of EU-attitude studies. 
Controlling for sociodemographic factors (age, gender and education) and commonly proposed 
determinants of euroscepticism and support for further integration (economic rationality, 
culture/identity and domestic political context), I find that value prioritisations have a limited, 
but significant explanatory power on the observed variation. I compare both the main and the 
interactive effects of values and attitudes, both between European Social Survey (ESS) rounds 
and between the three countries, and provide some tentative explanations for the observed 
variation. Particularly strong are the positive effects of “conservation” values (characterised by 
an emphasis on security, conformity and tradition) on support and trust in the EU, and the 
negative effects of “openness to change” values. I conclude that, while human values as 
measured in the ESS portrait value questionnaire contribute positively to explaining EU 
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Attitudes towards the European Union have been studied since the inception of the so-called 
“European Project”. Following the developing nature of the EU, its institutional framework and 
the widening and deepening of its jurisdiction, the research has evolved from being largely 
focused on economic utility to also exploring regional and national identities, party-political 
considerations and even psychological traits as determinants of EU attitudes. The scholarship 
on the EU, and people’s perceptions of it, has identified that Europeans increasingly think that 
the EU and its constituent institutions have a considerable “democratic deficit”. The democratic 
deficit of the EU, if left unmitigated, is detrimental to the future prospects of further integration 
and a potential threat to the Union’s continued existence and functioning in its current form. 
Research on the specific evaluations and considerations that determine peoples support for, or 
opposition to the EU, can be of great value for both national and EU-level politicians by 
providing insights into what people care about, the more popular and unpopular aspects of the 
EU, its institutions and policies, and can help policy-makers identify and thereby  potentially 
counteract any obstacles or threats. 
Human values, defined as desirable trans-situational goals that determine the considerations 
and motivations that guide people’s actions and attitudes, are a well-researched concept from 
the discipline of social psychology. Since the early 1990’s, researchers have developed ever-
more integrated, universally applicable theories regarding the specific ways in which values 
inform and determine people’s attitudes, behaviour and choices. These insights have 
increasingly been applied to the domain of political science; left/right party preferences, support 
for environmentalist policies and trust in institutions are among many political attitudes that 
can reliably be predicted through a value-theoretical approach. 
Relying on data from eight rounds of the biannual European social survey, which have been 
analysed through a series of linear regression analyses, I explore the relationship between values 
and attitudes towards the EU in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Specifically, I seek to answer 
the following question: Do basic human values, as conceptualised by Schwartz (e.g. 1992; 
1994) serve to explain the variance of attitudes towards the European Union? And if so, which 
of the values contribute to structure and inform opposition to, or support for, the EU and 
European integration?  
This thesis is structured in the following manner: First, I review and discuss the literature on 
the concept of attitudes, research on political attitudes and specifically on attitudes towards the 
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EU. Next, I present the scholarship on human values, Schwartz’s value theory and the ways in 
which the theory of basic human values has been applied in order to explain different kinds of 
political attitudes. Then I present the key causal mechanism – value activation - by which values 
influence attitudes, before using the insights provided by previous studies in order to derive 
some hypotheses regarding the effect of human value prioritisations on attitudes towards the 
EU among Scandinavians. I then describe the data which form the basis of my analyses, the 
dependent and independent variables that are explored, and the key methodological approaches 
that I have taken to test my hypotheses. Then I present the results of all the analyses, the main 
effects of all explanatory variables on attitudes towards the EU, and some interaction effects of 
both EU membership status and differential value-attitude relations at different points in time. 
Next, I discuss the degree to which my hypotheses are supported or unsupported, explain the 
mechanisms that underlie the findings, present some alternative explanations for any 
unexpected or inconsistent results, and specify the ways in which the results serve to elucidate 
the central questions of the thesis. Finally, I conclude by discussing some limitations of the 
study, and propose some directions for how the study of the value-EU attitude relations may be 





2 Theoretical background and motivations 
In this section of the thesis I will present the prevailing scholarly debates, the basic consensuses 
and disagreements and the empirical trends that I have identified and become familiar with 
through the process of gathering theoretical background material and empirical data that is 
useful and relevant to answering my research questions. A comprehensive literature review 
serves several functions in the earlier stages of developing a research project. There are 
numerous benefits to be gained by thoroughly exploring, analysing and systematically 
presenting the status of the scholarship on a given subject before attempting to make 
contributions to it. A comprehensive literature review allows researchers to establish the 
fundamental logic and mechanisms that underpin the hypothesized relations between variables. 
I seek to gain a more thorough understanding, potentially even establishing reliable answers, to 
the following questions:  
What is the apparent scholarly consensus on what is actually known or indicated by previous 
research? Are there fundamental gaps in our collective knowledge that allows for valuable or 
original contributions to be made? What are the types of empirical evidence and theoretical 
approaches that are most commonly applied in studies within this field (i.e. attitudes towards 
the EU), and what are their strengths and limitations? Are there clear trends in the 
methodological approaches that have previously been applied, and what are the most significant 
strengths and limitations to these approaches? Have previous findings in the literature been 
consistent or inconsistent, and if so, what can we deduce from this? 
Literature reviews may be structured in various ways. The presentation of the scholarship may 
be structured on the basis of authors’ ideological approach and key assumptions about human 
nature or socio-political development, on the geographical scope of studies, on 
conceptualization and measurement strategies, or based on the different explanatory approaches 
that are applied by different scholars. I have chosen to present the existing literature on attitudes 
towards the EU by grouping prominent studies according to the independent variables that 
researchers analyse as potential determinants of these attitudes. This review chapter includes 
sections dedicated to several of the academic topics, concepts, explanatory perspectives and 
empirical findings that are central to understanding attitudes towards the EU, and includes 
subchapters dedicated to the concept of attitudes, the concept of human values, Shalom 
Schwartz’s theory of basic human values and its inclusion in the European social survey, and 
on the relationship between basic human values and political attitudes. A comprehensive 
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overview of the predominant explanatory approaches to attitudes towards the EU is a core part 
of the review. The primary objectives of the literature review are twofold: First, an in-depth, 
structured review and presentation of the most important, intriguing and original contributions 
to the scholarship on the key concepts that are explored in this thesis serves as a stepping-stone 
towards hypothesising the relationships between key variables of interest, and towards 
answering the research questions. Secondly, the literature review provides the reader with the 
necessary background information and helps contextualise the choices that I have made in 
regard to research design, methods, data selection, variables of interest and so on. 
The literature review is structured as follows: First, I clarify the key concept of attitudes, 
describe some ways in which it is typically conceptualised and applied within social psychology 
and other social scientific research, and present some important attributes that are identified in 
the literature. Then I give an overview of the relationship between attitudes and behaviour and 
make the case for why the study of individual-level attitudes and their antecedents is relevant 
for scholars and policy-makers alike. Next, I give an overview of  the literature on political 
attitudes, with a particular focus on political support. Then I move on to give a brief description 
of historical and contemporary research on attitudes towards the EU. Finally, I present a 
thorough exploration of the three predominant explanatory perspectives found in the research 
literature on EU attitudes. 
2.1 Attitudes and attitude change 
This section of my theoretical overview of research and theoretical contributions on the subject 
of attitudes encompasses common definitions, different conceptualisations depending on 
subdiscipline and context, examples of attitude objects, and scholarship on attitude formation, 
strength and change. This section will primarily draw on literature from the discipline of social 
psychology, some of it stretching back almost one hundred years. For such a deep-dive into the 
concept of attitudes to be relevant of fruitful for the purposes of answering my research 
questions, I give attention to two distinct dimensions of attitudes and attitude research that have 
may have significance in the context of the relationship between values and attitudes towards 
the EU. The concept of attitudes is central to my research question, so it is necessary to become 
familiar with what the literature on the concept and its causes, implications and so on, agrees 
or disagrees on.  
In common parlance, attitudes and values are often used interchangeably. In scientific usage 
however, they are distinct in many ways. Due to this, in addition to the fact that values have a 
7 
 
special role in my research design, I will describe both concepts separately, as well as presenting 
an overview of the literature on the relationship between values and attitudes. The attitudes that 
I seek to explore and explain in this thesis are support for, or opposition to, the European Union.  
An early, commonly agreed upon definition of attitudes was given by psychologist Milton 
Rokeach (Rokeach 1968) as: “an enduring organization of several beliefs focused on a specific 
object or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner”. As I understand 
Rokeach’s definition, particularly his conception of an “enduring organisation” of beliefs, 
attitudes may be regarded as the tendencies or general dispositions of individuals to evaluate a 
particular object positively or negatively. The evaluations that form the basis of attitudes may 
be based on emotions, beliefs or past behaviours and experiences. Additionally, they may be 
internally consistent (e.g. being primarily associated with positive or with negative feelings or 
attributes) or ambivalent (e.g. being composed of a combination of positive and negative 
attributes). Early contributions to the literature on attitudes in social psychology proposed that 
the bipolarity in the direction of an attitude (favourable vs. unfavourable) was the most 
distinctive feature of the concept.  
Attitude objects are any objects that could be evaluated by an individual (Davidov 2008). As 
the term is used in psychology, an object may be literally anything that an individual can 
perceive and evaluate: it may be an event, a political entity, a company, a group of people, an 
ideology, a musical genre or any other observable or conceivable aspect of reality. Objects 
which are perceived to have mostly favourable attributes will tend to generate favourable 
attitudes towards them. This mechanism also applies to the inverse, i.e. objects which are 
evaluated to consist of or represent attributes that are regarded as being primarily negative or 
unfavourable. These objects tend to produce negative attitudes when its components are 
evaluated by individuals. However, unfavourable attributes are likely to contribute 
disproportionally to the corresponding attitudes due to what psychologists have called the 
negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman 2001). In this paper, the attitude object in focus is the 
European Union and the various processes and policies encompassed in the term “European 
integration”.   
Attitudes are comprised of conscious or subconscious evaluations of any number of 
characteristics of the attitude object. For individuals’ attitudes to change, one of two instances 
must take place. Either the underlying beliefs and values, their predispositions to evaluate 
certain things in a certain way, must change or evolve within the person due to new 
perspectives, “personal growth” or other psychological processes. More likely, attitude changes 
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can occur due to changes in external factors or characteristics of the attitude object in question. 
(Achen 1975; Fishbein 1963). This also appears to apply to political attitudes, which are 
discussed in more detail below.  
The attitudes that individuals hold, possibly also regarding European integration and the EU, 
are quite complex in additional ways. People’s attitudes tend to vary in strength depending on 
contextual factors. This variation may occur over time, from one social or economic context to 
another, and so on. Additionally, attitude strength has been found to follow certain patterns over 
people’s life cycles. Furthermore, the evaluations that constitute an individual’s attitudes are 
made with or without intention or focus, i.e. actively or passively, consciously or 
subconsciously.  
For these reasons, people’s attitudes are subject to revision and adjustment, i.e. attitude change, 
when the underlying beliefs and evaluations that comprise them change in significant ways. 
However, they tend to persist over time (Ajzen and Fishbein 2000). I regard attitude theory, and 
understanding attitude change in particular, as relevant to my thesis. To reiterate, attitudes are 
made up of generalised evaluations of any aspect of any object, at any time, which in turn 
produce or determine a predisposition to hold generally positive, neutral or negative beliefs 
about an object. My motivation is to contribute to the research-based pool of knowledge about 
people’s attitudes towards the EU, and the social psychological literature seems to indicate that 
EU attitudes are in sum made up of individual evaluations of any of its characteristics. This 
opens up for beneficial and useful new knowledge, of significance to scholars and policy-
makers alike, to be generated by examining EU attitudes through a multitude of different 
approaches. 
Since attitudes are often multidimensional (i.e. based on evaluations of more than one attribute 
of the object) and highly context-dependent, researchers may encounter several obstacles when 
exploring and explaining them. As is generally the norm for studies with research designs 
somewhat similar to this thesis, measurement of attitudes can be difficult and is approached 
differently by scholars. Attitudes can be measured simply by a researcher asking respondents 
to report their attitudes, or by inferring attitudes from respondents’ spontaneous evaluative 
reactions to encountering or being prompted with the attitude object (Albarracín and Shavitt 
2018). The introduction of implicitly measuring attitudes, as opposed to traditional methods of 
relying primarily on self-reported survey data, has been a notable development in the 
scholarship on political and social attitudes.  
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The two previous paragraphs and the characteristics of people’s attitudes that I present, seem 
to intersect in a consequential matter. According to Albarracín and Shavitt (2018), 
understanding attitude change depends on measurement and conceptualisation: our 
understanding of the degree and nature of the change which occurs in a given attitude depends 
on our conceptualisation and our measurement methods and framework. According to 
Albarracín and Shavitt’s review of the literature (2018), understanding attitude change depends 
on whether scholars apply a “… theoretical conceptualisation of attitudes as being crystallised 
in memory, as in-the-moment evaluations, or as hybrid structures”. Here, the authors conclude 
that attitudes in most cases are partly based on memory and experience, and partly constructed 
on the fly or ad-hoc (Albarracin and Shavitt 2018; Albarracín et al. 2005). In other words, they 
argue that a hybrid-structure conceptualisation of attitudes is most useful for understanding 
attitude change. Furthermore, attitudes can be interdependent; an individual is likely to evaluate 
two separate but similar objects in a similar manner. As I have noted, an attitude is comprised 
of a number of evaluations about various attributes of an attitude object. The total number of 
attributes that are assessed, and the relative importance that is given to each of them, will vary 
depending on the individual’s interest in, and familiarity with the object in question. All of these 
factors should be taken into account when drawing conclusions about the relationship between 
explanatory variables and attitudes towards the EU.  
2.2 The relationship between attitudes and behaviour 
I will now move on to the next theoretical step: understanding the ways in which attitudes can 
determine or predict people’s actions. The relationship between attitudes and actions has been 
of interest to scholars, particularly social psychologists, for nearly a century. Certain debates 
are still unsettled, however there appears to be a certain degree of consensus on some of the 
manners in which attitudes (understood as generally positive, neutral or negative evaluative 
orientations by individuals) directly or indirectly shape the behaviour of individuals.  
Attitudinal measures are commonly explored as predictors of behaviour, building on the 
assumption that the attitudes that people hold can directly or indirectly cause, reflect or at the 
very minimum correlate substantially with specific behaviours. This is especially true for pre-
election polling, which overall tends to provide quite reliable predictions of voting behaviour 
on the basis of attitudes expressed through survey responses that are either explicitly or 
implicitly measured. The same is true for consumers’ attitudes towards products or brands as 
predictors of the likelihood of future purchases. However, much of the research on attitudes 
published in the 20th century has tended to dismiss, or at least strongly question the validity of 
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attitudinal measures as reliable predictors of future behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; 
Rokeach 1967; Ehrlich 1969). In the last few decades, however, social psychology has 
witnessed a renewed interest in the attitude-behaviour relationship, and new insights and near-
consensuses have become established.  
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) posit that the emerging view of attitude theorists is that attitudes are 
only one of many factors that determine people’s behaviour. This position reaffirms the 
relevance and importance of attitudes, while simultaneously indicating that attitudes will often 
be largely unrelated to behaviour. In a series of studies on the topic of attitudes and attitude-
behavioural linkages, Ajzen and Fishbein (Ajzen and Fishbein 1973; 1977; Fishbein 1963; 
1973; Fishbein and Ajzen 1972; 1974; 1975) have developed the following argument: an 
individual’s attitudes towards an object likely influences the general pattern of her responses to 
encountering the object, but does not necessarily predict any given action. A core assumption 
is that a specific behaviour is determined by the person’s intention to perform the behaviour. 
This intention is in turn a function of the person’s attitudes towards performing the action in 
question, in addition to the individual’s subjective norms and preferred modes of conduct. 
Consequently, a single action may be predicted by the attitudes towards performing the act, 
provided that there is a significant correlation between a person’s intention and the behaviour 
in question (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977). 
A key concept in the scholarship on the attitude-behavioural linkages is called the principle of 
consistency. This refers to the common assumption that we can generally expect a person’s 
behaviours (e.g. voting, activism or consumer preferences) to be consistent with the attitudes 
that they hold. The strength with which an attitude is held and/or expressed tends to be a good 
predictor of behaviour. The greater the attitude strength, the more likely it is to directly affect 
or inform an individual’s behaviour. In a similar vein, the relative importance or personal 
relevance of the attitude is quite consequential. If an attitude has a high self-interest for a person 
(i.e. it is commonly held and promoted by a group or community that the person either is a 
member of, or wishes to become a member of), these attitudes will tend to be regarded as 
particularly important and thus are likely to determine their behaviour. Consequently, these 
attitudes will likely have a very strong influence on an individual’s behaviour, as opposed to 
attitudes that are generated on the basis of poor knowledge, limited interest or spontaneous and 
intuitive evaluations of the object in question.  
Following the logic presented above, European citizens’ attitudes towards the EU can generate 
different behaviours. It is reasonable to assume that people who hold positive, preferable 
11 
 
attitudes towards the EU and European integration are likely to act in ways that facilitate 
further political and economic integration, for example by voting for eurosupportive parties and 
candidates, by engaging in pro-European lobbying, formal or informal activism, or by 
participating in intra-EU collaborative arrangements (e.g. business ventures or research 
projects) 
2.3 Political attitudes, support and opposition to political systems 
This section of the literature review covers what social psychologists and political scientists 
sometimes refer to as “political attitude theory”. The insights provided by theories of individual-
level attitude formation and change towards objects of a political nature can contribute to a 
better understanding of the mechanisms by which identity, economy and domestic politics 
affect the attitudes that in turn facilitate or constrain processes of European integration. As 
mentioned in my introduction, the concept of attitudes with all its possible antecedents, 
consequences, characteristics and perceived meanings is of great interest to social scientists and 
policy-makers alike. This point is especially true regarding political attitudes. These attitudes 
can be defined as ones where the object is political in some sense. In this context, the attitude 
object may be a party, an ideology, a regulatory economic policy, overall governmental 
performance, perceived injustices or any other conceivable entity, issue or object which is 
generally understood as being “political”.  
Most individual-level attitudes are a private matter, with potential implications for a low 
number of people and of minimal interest to scholars or policy-makers. Political attitudes are 
quite different. Through the processes of electoral contestation and civil society organisation 
and discourse, people’s political attitudes carry with them implications for societal development 
(Achen 1975). People’s political attitudes are most often “tapped” or measured through various 
forms of surveys which are carried out either by governmental agencies or academic research 
teams. The direct effects of political attitudes on society are probably most apparent to casual 
observers and researchers when countries perform national referenda on specific issues. In these 
instances, the outcome of a referendum can likely be assumed to reflect the attitudes of the 
electorate towards a certain policy. An individual vote may be presumed to constitute an 
expression of an individual’s attitudes, while the sum of the votes that are cast in one direction 
or the other can indicate the collective attitudes of the citizenry (i.e. national or mass public 
attitudes). However, the sum of evaluations about political objects such as policy proposals, 
individual cabinet members or government performance also constitute much of the basis on 
which party preferences and organisational commitments (political or civic) are determined. 
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Therefore, political attitudes can be expected to have relevant implications that far exceed the 
limited scope of referenda and single-issue contestation.  
In the context of the European Union, political attitudes and their implications are also highly 
relevant and have been studied extensively. In their 2016 review article, Sara Hobolt and 
Catherine de Vries (Hobolt and De Vries 2016) state a salient, paradoxical example of the 
relationship between citizens’ EU attitudes and the EU itself, and how this relationship 
increasingly determines outcomes of European integration: “… The unprecedented 
development in supranational governance has led to greater public contestation of the 
European Union, but at the same time the Union is increasingly reliant on public support for 
its continued legitimacy”. This quote is particularly indicative of the motivations behind the 
entirety of this thesis.  In the following sections, I proceed to give a brief but thorough review 
of the current state of the research literature on EU attitudes. 
The political attitude object that I focus on in this thesis is the EU, its institutions and and more 
broadly the process of European integration. The specific attitudes that I wish to explore are 
those representing support for, or opposition to, this political object. While scholarly focus has 
shifted from explaining support for the EU towards explaining Euroscepticism and opposition 
to integration, I regard support and opposition as two opposing sides of an attitude continuum, 
and not as separate attitudes.  
2.4 Research on attitudes towards the EU 
In the research literature on EU attitudes, the concept is variously referred to as attitudes 
towards the EU, attitudes towards European integration (a process led mainly by the EU and its 
related institutions), support for/opposition to the EU, attitudes towards European unification, 
and so on. While there is considerable variation in the specific terminology that scholars use, I 
find studies broadly referring to “EU attitudes” as well as the somewhat more common 
treatment of attitudes towards European integration (including related processes, institutions, 
actors and treaties) to encompass the same dimensions and likely measure the same sentiments 
regardless of the labels that are applied to the processes which are studied. 
Attitudes towards the European Union have been systematically studied since the earliest stages 
of European integration, but most of the literature has emerged since the early 1990’s. At its 
inception, the intergovernmental collaboration and arrangements that would become the EU of 
today were primarily economic in scope. Depending on the degree to which citizens were even 
modestly interested or knowledgeable about the EU, they were likely to couch their attitudes 
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towards it in terms of the subjective or objective benefits it afforded themselves and their local, 
regional, ethnic or cultural communities. This was reflected in early studies on attitudes towards 
the EU, which focused almost exclusively on individuals’ assessments of the economic utility 
of the EU for themselves and for the various groups and communities (e.g. ethnic, religious, 
regional or national) that they belong to and identify with. As the EU gained increasing 
decision-making powers and steadily expanded the range of policy areas under its jurisdiction, 
this limited focus on rational evaluations of perceived utility proved insufficient. This 
development has given way to the development of new and complimentary theoretical 
perspectives on EU attitudes.  
Hooghe and Marks (2015) and Hobolt and De Vries (2016) argue that the European Union is 
currently more dependent on citizens’ support than ever before. This argument echoes Hooghe 
and Marks’s (2009) previous claim that the conditions determining the perceived legitimacy 
and authority, future outlook and policy-making capabilities of the European Union have 
gradually developed from a state of “permissive consensus” into what they term a “constraining 
dissensus”. To put it simply, the European Union and the representatives that constitute it are 
increasingly constrained, checked and held accountable by the mass public of its member states. 
There are several factors that contribute to the growth of this constraining dissensus among 
European citizens. First off, the fact that European integration has had numerous tangible 
implications for both politics, economic activity and sovereignty for the member states which 
have come into the fold of the EU. As the EU has begun generating legislation on diverse, often 
contentious topics, some Europeans increasingly view the EU as overstepping its bounds and 
democratic mandate. Only one of the Union’s three main institutions is directly elected, and the 
Parliament is arguably the one with the least authority.  Secondly, the EU and matters relating 
to it has become increasingly politicised. The increasing proliferation of referendums on EU 
matters is both a symptom or side-effect, and a key driver of the increasing contestation that 
faces the EU. The rise of eurosceptic parties and the politicisation of EU issues which had 
previously been decided outside of the realm of domestic party contestation are also important 
factors that contribute to the mounting challenge the Union faces. These factors, as well as other 
developments and trends, are explored in detail below. 
Following these aforementioned developments, research on public attitudes towards European 
integration has shifted from focusing on support for the EU to an increasing focus on opposition 
to it, i.e. euroscepticism. Most studies tend to focus on the determinants or causes of these 
attitudes. However, there is also a growing literature on the consequences of these attitudes, 
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and the mechanisms by which they influence and structure outcomes of the integration process 
at the European level. This second angle is perhaps best exemplified by Hooghe and Marks’s 
proposal of a postfunctionalist theory of integration which diverges from the well-known liberal 
intergovernmental, functionalist and neofunctionalist “grand theories” by directly factoring 
public opinion into the equation. Regardless of the angle, the core question remains the same: 
What explains variation in attitudes toward European integration?  
2.5 The reaction to the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties as indicators of growing 
Euroscepticism 
The Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties (1992 and 2007, respectively) are regarded as critical 
junctures in the course of European integration. Both of these contentious treaties included 
several “democratizing” measures aimed at increasing the legitimacy of the EU, while also 
being highly controversial and strongly opposed by many Europeans due to perceptions of 
jurisdictional overreach and challenges or threats to national sovereignty. The (un)popular 
responses to the two Treaties were largely unexpected and sparked a new wave of scholarly 
interest in the subject of popular opposition to the European project. To once again invoke the 
brilliant formulation by Hobolt and DeVries (2016): together, the Maastricht and Lisbon 
Treaties mark the transition from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus.  
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, was 
initiated with the intention of complementing the successfully established economic union 
(1991) by opening the way and taking steps towards establishing a political union among the 
member states. The EU politicians who pushed for the creation and ratification of the TEU 
argued that, amongst other things, the newly consolidated economic union could not advance 
any further and would stagnate, and fail to reach its potential, without some form of political 
union surrounding and supporting it. This argument was entirely consistent with Haas’s logic 
of jurisdictional spillover in the integrational processes. True completion of the Single 
European Market would require a single currency. This, in turn, would require a European 
central bank. Moreover, a single central bank requires a single monetary policy for all members. 
Common monetary policy of this magnitude in turn required coherent, coordinated policy-
making in many areas (including foreign and defence policy) that had previously been far 
beyond the scope of European Community decision-making.  
In some ways, the TEU was a natural follow-up to the Single European Market project. While 
the governments and EU representatives of EC member states were arguably the most 
enthusiastic proponents of the perceived benefits of pursuing additional integrative measures, 
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the TEU received broad support by a majority of organized political actors throughout the EC. 
Most political parties in EC countries supported the proposed treaty, and therefore politicians 
and scholars alike envisioned few difficulties or potential threats to obtaining ratification and 
implementation of the TEU agenda. However, some member states had formal requirements 
postulating that the people needed to be consulted (primarily through referendum) before such 
a consequential treaty could be signed.  
What emerged through this process was an apparent wave of popular opposition to further 
integration that was much larger than expected, and which raised certain doubts about the 
underpinnings of the Union itself (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). This became apparent not only 
in those countries which held a referendum on the ratification of the treaty. In 1992, the Danes 
famously voted “no”, and the French referendum ended in a very narrow “yes” followed by 
fierce debates among academics, politicians and the public at large. After negotiating a series 
of concessions and exclusive amendments known as the Treaty of Denmark, the Danes 
eventually voted in favour of the Treaty. However, a feeling remained among observers that 
politicians and commentators (journalists, pundits and activists) had seriously underestimated 
or misperceived the public’s attitudes towards Europe. It is still unclear whether this was mainly 
due to willful ignorance, hubris or the elites’ disconnection and inability to adequately gauge  
the sentiments and political preferences of their constituents. 
Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) provided a ground-breaking contribution to the study of 
the underlying reasons for why the referenda turned out the way they did, and how the 
Maastricht (and to a lesser extent Lisbon) treaties became so contentious with very limited 
forewarning. The authors explore public responses to the proposed treaty in Denmark and 
France, and compare them to Ireland – the third of the EC countries in which a referendum on 
the Maastricht Treaty/TEU was held. Interestingly, the Irish voters passed the ratification of the 
treaty with a handsome margin. This begs a series of questions regarding the contextual factors, 
whether cultural, domestic-political or economic, that influenced individual-level evaluations 
and support for/opposition to European integration.  
Franklin, Marsh and McLaren present three possible explanations for the contentious nature of 
the Maastricht Treaty that they go on to explore in further detail: 
1) Popular sentiment regarding Europe (incl. the EU, its institutions, its political actors and 
decision-making procedures, its self-professed and perceived ambitions and goals, etc.) 
was by no means as positive as had been believed, and people were never really in favour 
of the Maastricht Treaty and remained sceptical about the EU in general. In other words, 
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had the EC gone to greater lengths to accurately gauge the levels of support for further 
integration among the populations of its member states, the surprising outcomes could 
likely have been avoided.  
2) The second possibility is also apparently straightforward: that voters changed their minds 
during the (somewhat restricted) campaigns, because they did not like what they heard 
about the Maastricht Treaty – and the votes against the treaty reflected this new public 
awareness. If this explanation is true, then it could clearly be seen as a sign that European 
integration has gone far enough, and that future attempts to blatantly expand the EU’s 
jurisdiction and authority will likely be met with similarly strong opposition, if not even 
more pronounced.  
3) The third possible explanation presented by Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) carries 
quite different implications if it is to be accepted: that the Maastricht results can best be 
understood in terms of domestic party competition (Cue-taking and benchmarking 
approach; Hobolt and De Vries 2016).  
The authors find that prior to the Maastricht conference (when people must have been largely 
in the dark regarding the actual contents and implications of the treaty as it was still under 
negotiation behind closed doors), Europeans apparently expressed broad support for “Europe” 
and the idea of unification. Large majorities of Eurobarometer respondents from the three 
countries (Denmark, France and Ireland) reported that they regarded the “European experience” 
as having been a good thing, possibly contributing to the incorrect notions that these apparently 
supportive sentiments would persist into the future. The authors’ two-question index measuring 
these opinions showed significant ignorance or ambivalence about the European project. 
Generally, respondents showed limited familiarity with the EU’s institutional arrangement. 
Some of this apparent ignorance or disinterest could be explained by the relative complexity of 
the functioning of the EU and its institutions. Furthermore, limited media coverage of intra-EU 
affairs and procedures likely contributed to the ignorance or disinterest expressed by citizens. 
These and related factors are discussed in more detail in below. Nevertheless, they also 
identified significant majorities that expressed largely supportive attitudes towards European 
integration. 
The authors identify three significant features of the opinion distribution within the pool of 
answers given to the 1992 Eurobarometer survey, which included questions related to 
respondents’ perceptions of the Maastricht treaty, its contents and assessments of the treaty’s 
potential implications at the individual as well as national levels. Measurements of pro-and anti-
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EU attitudes immediately after the conflicts surrounding ratification showed that there had been 
little change with respect to European citizens’ views about integration and the EU, although 
support was measured to have fallen slightly in Denmark and France. Secondly, specific support 
for the Treaty itself was considerably weaker than that for “Europe” in general. This illustrates 
the differential nature of specific and diffuse support (which are explained in greater detail 
below) in the context of the EU: negative or unpreferable evaluations of a specific political 
outcome (i.e. low specific support) do not translate to similarly negative evaluations of the 
regime or socio-political order in which the unfavourable outcomes are generated.  Lastly, one-
third of European voters still reported having no discernible opinion or preferences regarding 
the treaty even three months after the Maastricht conference. This final point illustrates the 
persistence of disinterest in, and ignorance of, the EU and European-level politics among 
Europeans.  
Studies on EU-attitudes generally have the following in common: to some varying extent, the 
factors that are of particular relevance for research on EU attitudes revolve around the causes 
or predeterminants, contextually dependent variation, and also the consequences of varying 
public support for European integration and EU attitudes in general.  
2. 6 Three predominant explanatory approaches 
A thorough review of the literature indicates that there are three predominant theoretical 
approaches to explaining variation in attitudes towards the European Union: the utilitarian (or 
rational economic) approach focusing on the individual and national-level benefits, perceived 
or objective, of membership and integration; the identity-driven (or broadly cultural) approach 
stressing nationalist and identitarian motivations or determinants; and the domestic-political 
perspective that focuses on the effects of cue-taking and/or benchmarking with reference to the 
domestic political context.  
Additionally, there is a small but growing literature that applies concepts and theoretical 
perspectives from other disciplines such as social psychology and sociology. Notably, Julie 
Hassing-Nielsen (2016) has explored EU attitudes, specifically the responsiveness to positive 
or negative media framing of EU issues, in relation to people’s placement in the Big 5 
personality typology. The aforementioned studies, despite their theoretical and methodological 
differences, all treat public support for European integration as their dependent variable. There 
has been far less research on the effects of public opinion towards the EU on European 
integration, i.e. treating levels of support as an explanatory variable. One exception to this trend 
18 
 
in the scholarship is Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’s so-called Postfunctionalist theory of 
European integration, which complements the traditional neofunctionalist and liberal 
intergovernmentalist “grand theories” by exploring the differential effects and challenges 
caused by increasing anti-EU sentiments in conjunction with national and supranational 
politicians’ diminishing discretionary powers and increasing responsiveness to eurosceptic 
publics. 
An overview of the literature suggests that attitudes towards the EU vary significantly, likely 
reflecting different degrees of certainty or ambivalence among individuals. This variation may 
be determined by factors such as an individual’s political sophistication or cognitive skills, their 
consumption of political news, their educational and occupational skills and so on. This one-
dimensional conceptualization of support is increasingly challenged by scholars taking new, 
multi-dimensional approaches to understanding the concept of support for European 
integration. Some of the explanatory factors that are growing in relevance within the study of 
support are satisfaction with government performance, differential conceptions of national and 
regional identities, rational assessments of economic utility, prejudice, emergence of right-and 
left-wing populist “entrepreneurs” and so on (Hobolt and De Vries 2016). All of these 
dimensions are in some way linked to the main explanatory perspectives that are explored in 
depth in the forthcoming chapters.  
Studies that explore the topic of support for European integration, and for the EU in general, 
often base their conceptualization of support on David Easton’s seminal theory of support for 
political systems (Easton 1965; 1975). Easton defined political support as “the way in which a 
person evaluatively orients himself to some [political] objects through either his attitudes or 
behaviour”. In common usage, support generally refers to actions and behaviours that may 
serve as indicators of support for some object. These behavioural indicators include supportive 
acts such as activism or advocacy (Easton 1965). In the context of political science research, 
however, support is more complex and difficult to measure than by merely observing people’s 
explicit behaviours. It is useful to view political support as a predeterminant, or perhaps even 
as a consequence, of these actions, as political support or lack thereof does not necessarily 
predict actions in a reliable manner. Therefore, research on support for political actors, entities 
and policies instead tends to focus on the attitudes that serve as expressions of support or 
opposition.  
Easton (1965; 1975) distinguishes between diffuse and specific political support, which he 
refers to as different “modes” with separate causes and consequences. The distinction between 
19 
 
regime-oriented and policy-specific support for political systems is also applicable to the 
context of support for European integration. Regime support (i.e. diffuse support) encompasses 
the evaluative orientations that are directed towards the constitutional and institutional 
foundation and arrangement of the European Union. Specific support, on the other hand, is 
contingent on evaluations of specific policies and outcomes produced by the EU. Diffuse 
support is determined by evaluations of basic characteristics of the regime itself, such as its 
democratic legitimacy, its utility and the degree to which the regime is preferable to alternative 
arrangements. The characteristics that serve as the objects of regime support primarily have a 
constitutional foundation, thus being quite consistent and less vulnerable to short-term 
evaluations.  
In contrast to regime support for the established democracies that comprise it, diffuse support 
for the European Union is inherently fragile (Hobolt and De Vries 2016). This is due to the 
institutional uniqueness of the European Union: it is a hybrid multilevel political system that is 
far more integrated and has a much larger jurisdiction and policy-making capabilities/authority 
than any other international organization in which sovereign nations collaborate. However, it 
does not meet the definitional criteria of a state. Additionally, scholars and European citizens 
alike see the EU as having a substantial democratic deficit. The democratic deficit of the EU 
refers to its perceived lack of accessibility to ordinary citizens, lack of representation for 
common people and minority opinions, and the absence or insufficiency of direct 
accountability. The establishment of the European Parliament in 1979 was the first of numerous 
measures that have been implemented specifically to increase the democratic legitimacy of the 
European Union, but scholarly consensus appears to indicate that these measures have done 
little to diminish perceptions of democratic deficits within the EU.  
In the following three sections of the thesis, I will present key contributions and seminal studies 
pertaining to each of the tree predominant approaches to explaining variance in attitudes 
towards the EU, including the different explanatory variables that scholars have examined, the 
proposed mechanisms by which they influence attitudes, and some strengths and weaknesses 
of each perspective.  
2.6.1 The economic-utilitarian approach to explaining variation in EU attitudes 
The first of the three predominant explanatory approaches found in the literature is the 
economic-utilitarian approach. Studies that belong to this explanatory perspective tend to focus 
on attitudes toward European integration as a function of individuals’ rational evaluations, 
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however well-informed these may be, of the perceived benefits and disadvantages of EU 
membership and increased economic coordination and cooperation between Member States. 
This perspective is applied to several different, often overlapping dimensions, and economic-
utilitarian explanations to EU support exist at both the national and individual levels. Cost-
benefits analyses (alternatively referred to as rational economic calculations or utilitarian 
evaluations) are sometimes called the “instrumentalist approach”. Herein, support or opposition 
is explained in terms of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of integration, unification 
and coordination at the European level. These evaluations of costs and benefits may be 
egocentric (i.e. based on subjective self-interest) or sociotropic (i.e. based on assessments of 
perceived overall costs and benefits for local, regional or national communities). 
The European Union of today is the descendant of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
which was established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and included six member states: France, 
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) is largely attributed to the initiative taken by French foreign minister 
Robert Schuman. The motivations behind the establishment of the ECSC are clearly stated in 
what is referred to as the Schuman Declaration of 1950: to “… make war not only unthinkable 
but materially impossible”. By organizing certain specific sectors of these countries’ economies 
under a centralized authority, cooperating countries would ensure common oversight and the 
ability to enforce swift and effective countermeasures in the case of a participating member 
showing signs of militarization (indicated by patterns of resource allocation, investment and 
transparency surrounding production and imports of coal and steel). Additionally, the creation 
of a common market of these valuable resources would remove or neutralise competition 
between the countries, further decreasing the likelihood of animosity and possible 
confrontation. The establishment of the ECSC was the world’s first instance of a system of 
supranational governance, even if its jurisdiction and the scope of its activities was limited at 
first. However, the ECSC was composed of four separate institutions: a High Authority of 
independent appointees, a Common Assembly of national members of parliament, a Special 
Council of national ministers, and a Court of Justice. These four bodies are the progenitors of 
today’s European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the EU and the European 
Court of Justice, respectively.  
The institutional blueprint for the eventual integration and pooling of decision-making powers 
and jurisdiction on political as well as economic matters was determined as early as 1951, . 
However, the ECSC and the European Economic Community into which it transformed was 
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long regarded, and rightfully so, as a primarily economic project. Consequently, research on 
attitudes towards European integration focused largely on perceptions of economic factors, and 
citizens’ rational evaluations of economic utility. Economic growth and development are indeed 
both central motivations for European integration as well as being among the EU’s predominant 
responsibilities.  
However, purely economic calculations were not the only determinants of support for 
integration in the earliest stages of research on the subject. Ronald Inglehart (1977) famously 
theorized that the post-war generations would increasingly develop so-called postmaterialist 
values due to the unprecedented affluence, freedom of choice and expression and security (i.e. 
sustained peace on the continent and the absence of physical threats) that many of them 
experienced. While older generations tended to be more concerned with material and economic 
security, the post-war generations largely took this security and prosperity for granted and 
instead placed greater importance on immaterial goals. Environmentalism, racial and gender 
equality, self-expression and individual autonomy are some examples of postmaterialist values 
highlighted by Inglehart (1977). Inglehart’s argument, while at one time being both relevant 
and empirically supported, has since been quite fiercely contested (e.g. Janssen 1991; Anderson 
and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998a). 
Dalton and Eichenberg (1991) performed a cross-national study of support for European 
integration, and argued that in general, Europeans assess and form their opinions on and 
attitudes towards EC (European Community, the predecessor of the EU) membership based on 
evaluations of their personal and national economic situation. In a seminal article on attitudes 
toward European integration, Gabel and Palmer (1995) challenge Dalton and Eichenberg’s view 
of the relationship between economic interests, both national and individual ones, and European 
integration. Dalton and Eichenberg argue that Europeans evaluate EC membership on the basis 
of perceptions about the general economic situation in their country, at present. In other words, 
any and all economic considerations may influence attitudes towards the usefulness of 
European integration, even if their specific causes are exogenous to the EC.   
Gabel and Palmer oppose Eichenberg and Dalton’s (Dalton and Eichenberg 1991; Eichenberg 
and Dalton 1993) theory, arguing that EC policies and integrative measures by national 
governments, are only some of several factors influencing personal and national economic 
welfare. They view the impact of EC policies as secondary to exogenous changes in the global 
economy, and to domestic politics and economic management. Thus, they contest Dalton and 
Eichenberg’s proposal that European citizens primarily hold the EC accountable for their 
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economic well-being and prospects. Gabel and Palmer’s analysis of Eurobarometer data 
supports their contention, showing that only 12.3 percent of respondents named EC economic 
politics as the primary source of their country’s economic problems. These results subsequently 
lead them to several hypotheses about the relationship between attitudes towards European 
integration, and economic conditions (past, present and future) at the national and individual 
levels. 
As I have previously noted, the vast majority of existing studies on public support for the EU 
have offered economically oriented explanations for the variation in people’s attitudes within 
and between European countries. Some recurring variables that are explored in these studies 
are satisfaction with one’s own income, job security, occupational skills, educational level and 
degrees of intra-EU trade. For instance, Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) have made 
the argument that citizens are differently affected by the liberalization of the EU market: an 
increasingly liberal labour market will prove more threatening for people with low levels of 
education and less marketable skills. As employers become able to draw manpower from across 
the entirety of the EU, as opposed to relying on exclusively domestic labour, low-skilled jobs 
may be filled and appear to be “taken” by citizens of poorer member states who are willing to 
work for less. This liberalization of the labour market can also have an adverse effect on the 
wages of low-skilled workers. These two factors lead Gabel and Palmer (1995) to argue that 
low-skilled workers are more likely to oppose European integration. Conversely, they argue 
that the more educated segments of the population are not only less affected by such job 
insecurity, but educated or high-skilled individuals also have greater possibilities of getting jobs 
in other member states. Furthermore, individuals with relatively high levels of education may 
be better capable of understanding and thus accurately evaluating the EU’s performance, 
obstacles or benefits. Thus, they argue that individuals with higher levels of education and 
occupational skills will be more likely to hold favourable attitudes towards the EU.  
The liberalization of capital markets is also said to produce similar effects. The increasing 
opportunities for investment and economic engagements provided by EU membership are 
theorized to favour citizens with higher income levels and more capital. International economic 
openness pressurizes welfare systems and shifts the burden of taxation from mobile factors of 
production (e.g. capital) to immobile factors (e.g. labour). Additionally, economic 
internationalization and expanding intra-EU trade affects the relative scarcity of assets. The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem posits that trade benefits individuals who own factors with which 
the national economy is well endowed and hurts those who own relatively scarce factors 
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(Mayda and Rodrik 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 415). Hooghe and Marks (2004) theorize 
that in wealthier, capital-rich member states, unskilled workers would be more likely to hold 
Eurosceptic attitudes, and managers and professionals would be more Euro-supportive. In 
poorer, more labour-rich member states, they expect the inverse to be the case.  
It is apparent that most existing, especially earlier research on popular support for EU 
integration assumes support to largely be a function of economic calculations. Sánchez-Cuenca 
(2000) sees the dynamics of EU attitudes and cost/benefit-calculations quite differently. He 
argues that support (i.e. pro-integration or pro-EU attitudes) is the consequence of the interplay 
between supranational and national politics; Favourable opinions of the functioning and 
advantageousness of supranational institutions and politicians, when combined with less 
favourable assessments of national institutions, likely contributes positively to support for the 
EU and by extention the processes of European integration. His core assumption is as follows: 
the worse the opinion of the national political system and its actors, the lower the opportunity 
cost of transferring sovereignty or jurisdictional authority to Europe. Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) 
illustrates this point by showing that levels of support for integration are higher in countries 
with greater corruption and less extensive welfare systems. 
In addition to these individual-level effects of economic concerns and consequences, people 
may also be sensitive to collective economic circumstances, i.e. the effects of EU membership 
and integration on the whole of society or the various groups and communities with which they 
identify and wherein they are embedded. These concerns for collective, in-group-specific 
benefits or costs are generally referred to as “sociotropic concerns”. Conversely, scholars have 
dubbed the private or individual concerns and perceptions of costs and benefits “egocentric”.  
Following several rounds of enlargement towards the post-Soviet Central and Eastern European  
states and poorer Southern European countries, the EU now encompasses states with very 
different levels of wealth, and economies of different sizes with distinct characteristics. A 
handful of member states, primarily the older Western European ones, are net contributors to 
the EU’s budgets. The relatively poorer member states, which make up the majority of members 
of the EU, are net beneficiaries of EU spending. According to several studies, citizens of 
countries that are net beneficiaries of EU spending should be more inclined to support European 
integration, while citizens of net benefactor states will more likely oppose it (e.g. Gabel 1998a). 
This logic is often present in federalized states as well, where the poorer regions tend to favour 
centralization while richer regions favour decentralization.  
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Furthermore, the economic factors that may influence attitudes towards the EU can be either 
subjective or objective (Dalton and Eichenberg 1991). Citizens who feel hopeful or confident 
in their economic future, both personally and for their country, are likely to regard European 
integration as a positive thing. Conversely, those who are fearful or insecure about their 
economic future will be more likely to oppose the EU. European integration creates “winners 
and losers” in several additional ways. Occupational skills, cognitive mobilizational capacity, 
job security and relative wealth have all been found to affect EU attitudes, albeit with different 
strength and high contextual dependency (i.e. from one stage in life to another, in economic 
booms or recessions, etc.).  
The final recurring factor that is studied through the rational economic approach is how a 
country’s institutional makeup influences its citizens’ attitudes towards the EU, by way of 
differential market dynamics, economic conditions and welfare systems. The EU encompasses 
member states with quite distinct institutional arrangements based on different political 
traditions. This is especially true regarding three key aspects of a country’s political economy: 
labour coordination, business coordination and redistribution of wealth. The further a country 
lies from the EU median of labour coordination, business coordination and redistributive 
arrangements, the greater the costs imposed on citizens by integrational measures and EU 
legislation (Eichenberg and Dalton 1991; 1993). European integration tends to converge on a 
mixed-market model, which has different subjective and objective implications for citizens of 
different member states. Residents of social democratic Scandinavian states can likely expect 
to see their welfare systems diluted as European integration carries on, and citizens of liberal 
market economies can expect increasing redistribution over time. In social democratic systems, 
the left is expected to oppose integration, while the right will likely be supportive. In liberal 
market systems, the left will support integration while the right is likely to be opposed. 
However, there is broad scholarly consensus on the fact that supportive or oppositional attitudes 
towards the EU, and domestic political initiatives regarding Europe do not easily map onto 
traditional left/right cleavages of competition. This point will be elaborated further in the 
section of domestic political context-oriented explanatory approaches.  
Economic theories of citizens’ attitude formation are most useful when economic consequences 
can be perceived with a certain degree of accuracy, are large or significant enough to matter for 
ordinary citizens, and when an individual’s choice of preferred integrational outcomes are 
perceived to have an actual effect on policies, either by way of referenda or conventional 
elections. While it is true that the economic-utilitarian approach is increasingly being 
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supplemented and to some extent challenged by other explanatory approaches, and that the 
insights provided by this strand of research seem to be proving less valuable and robust on their 
own, there is still plenty of research interest in public attitudes to European integration in 
relation to economic factors. Economic conditions and evaluations of utility will likely always 
be an important determinant of EU-attitudes, but developments in the scholarship (notably ones 
presented and discussed in the two upcoming subchapters) seem to indicate that purely 
economic explanatory models are obsolete. 
2.6.2 National identity and culture-based approaches to explaining attitudes towards the 
EU 
More recently, the literature has been expanded by a growing focus on what we may summarily 
call cultural and identity-related determinants of EU attitudes. This second explanatory 
perspective encompasses considerations of national pride and territorial identity, degrees of 
national attachment or patriotism, inclusive versus exclusive conceptions of national and 
regional identity, and perceived cultural threats emanating from the processes of European 
integration and its consequences. Studies pertaining to the identity-based perspective typically 
conceive of the European Union as a polity that overarches established territorial communities, 
and consider how public opinion (namely support or opposition) and attitudes towards the EU 
are constrained by the ways citizens conceive and conceptualize their identities. Among the 
various cultural and territorial identities that individuals hold and seek to preserve, and that 
inform their political attitudes, the strongest ones are national identities. However, regional, 
ethnic and religious identities can also be mobilized in ways that determine support for the EU. 
It is important to note that most scholars do not regard the economic-utilitarian and identitarian 
perspectives as competing or mutually exclusive. Rather, the increasing scholarly focus on 
identity-based and cultural factors has come to complement and refine, and thus improve the 
explanatory power of the earlier theories.  
In the early days of the European project, it was commonly assumed and theorized that the 
processes of economic integration and increasing trade would eventually lead to the 
development and strengthening of shared political attitudes and a European identity among the 
people of Europe. Ernst Haas, a pioneering scholar of European integration, formulated this 
process into his theory of regional integration which focused on jurisdictional “spillover 
effects” as the main drivers of EU integration (Haas 1958). Economic coordination and pooling 
of decision-making powers would eventually come to necessitate a certain degree of socio-
political integration, but Haas expected this development to be slow-paced and largely 
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uncontentious. However, these spillover effects have failed to generate the expected pan-
European identities and loyalties that Haas imagined, and this conceptualization of support for 
the EU has increasingly become challenged (Hooghe and Marks 2004). While pioneers such as 
Haas (1958) and Inglehart (1970) were mostly concerned with the ways in which European 
integration affects and determines people’s conceptions of identity, recent research flips the 
causal arrow (Hooghe and Marks 2004).  
National identities and cultural concerns have been found to restrict and influence people’s 
support for the EU in several ways. In an influential study that pioneered the national-
identitarian approach to explaining EU attitudes, Lauren McLaren (2002) argues that most of 
the literature either willingly or unwillingly disregards “the heart of the nature of opposition…” 
by ignoring notions or perceptions of perceived cultural threats. Essentially, she argues that that 
citizens’ hostility toward foreigners and their wish to protect their culture from external 
influences could not be ignored. The primary challenges to the permissive consensus and elite-
driven integrational policies were posed by nationalist parties that mobilized people’s identities 
in their opposition to the EU.  
Notably, McLaren (2002) found that anti-immigration attitudes and concerns about the 
perceived threats posed by foreigners and the EUs policy of free movement of people appear to 
correlate quite strongly with opposition to European integration. McLaren argues that the 
degree to which a person supports or opposes the EU is determined not only by their rational 
evaluations of perceived costs and benefits of membership and continuing integration, but also 
by the degree to which they oppose immigration and feel threatened by globalization and ever-
growing immigration from both within and outside of the EU. She notes that for these anti-
immigrant sentiments to translate into opposition to European integration, individuals must 
(correctly or incorrectly) identify the EU and European-level policies as the primary source or 
the main driver of increasing immigration to their country. This argument is contingent on the 
previously theorized relationship between moderate-to high capabilities for cognitive 
mobilization, on the one hand, and EU support on the other (i.e. Inglehart 1977; Gabel 1998b). 
People’s educational levels have been found to strongly influence attitudes towards immigrants: 
Europeans that have completed a higher number of years of full-time education and achieved 
higher-than-average levels of educational attainment (vis-à-vis the national average), are on 
average more likely to express pro-immigrant attitudes than their less educated compatriots 
(Mayda 2006). Additionally, McLaren found that the strength of a person’s attachment and 
loyalty to their nation also had a significant effect: Europeans who expressed having a strong 
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loyalty and devotion to their country, and who identified strongly with their national 
community, were less likely to be supportive of the EU and continued European integration. 
One of the few drawbacks of McLaren’s pioneering study on EU support in relation to anti-
immigrant sentiments and prejudices, is that she fails to adequately explain the mechanisms 
that underpin this relationship. McLaren identifies a robust relationship between pro-immigrant 
stances and Eurosupport, and conversely between anti-immigrant attitudes and Euroscepticism. 
However, she does not discuss the potential antecedents of these attitudes, and as a result fails 
to prescribe any potential remedies.   
In a similar vein, Toshkov and Kortenska (2015) found that, among citizens of Spain, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and France, the growing numbers of immigrants to their country from 
newer Central and Eastern European member states has negatively impacted support for 
European integration. However, the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and attitudes 
towards European integration is not necessarily as straightforward as these studies seem to 
indicate. As I have previously noted, anti-immigrant attitudes translate to eurosceptic attitudes 
only insofar as people regard immigration as a direct consequence of EU-level policies and 
European integration.  
De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) argue that individuals who define immigrants to their 
country as the “out-group” will likely have a tendency to regard anyone with different a 
nationality, ethnicity or religious adherence from themselves as members of an out-group. 
Europeans who are negatively biased or prejudiced against immigrants are likely to be equally 
hostile towards other out-groups, such as citizens of fellow Member States. Therefore, they 
argue that since the EU removes borders, promotes socio-political coordination and reinforces 
multiculturalism, people that hold these attitudes towards “others” in general will also likely 
oppose European integration (De Vreese and Boomgarden 2005).   
One of the main challenges of examining anti-immigrant attitudes in relation to EU attitudes, 
is developing relevant, accurate measures of anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe. One of the 
most widely used measures of anti-immigrant attitudes, so called item indices, are argued by 
Kentmen-Cin and Erisen to be lacklustre. Such indices are constructed from survey questions 
that gauge respondents’ evaluations of how immigration can directly or indirectly affect their 
personal and collective (i.e. national) economic costs and benefits, the security of their 
community, and the safeguarding of their customary ways of life. Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 
(2017) argue that such indices do not allow for accurate identification of the relative explanatory 
power of the different components that make up prejudice toward immigrants. They propose 
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that there is a salient need to address how a diverse range of perceived cultural, security-related, 
individual and national economic and religious threats posed by immigrants independently 
affects opposition to European integration, the EU and its institutions, and the specific policies 
that emanate from the European level.  
Moreover, they challenge the studies which attempt to measure anti-immigrant attitudes by 
using the percentage of immigrants in EU member states based on the assumption that “… the 
larger the number of of immigrants, the greater the level of anti-immigrant sentiments will be” 
(Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017, 5). These measures are inadequate and of limited value, as the 
mere number of immigrants in a country is unlikely to adequately capture the multidimensional 
complexities of the perceived threats. McLaren and others have identified two distinct 
categories of perceived threats that motivate anti-immigrant attitudes. Realistic threats are those 
that people perceive that immigrants pose to the in-groups economic welfare and relative access 
to group resources (i.e. immigrants abusing or straining social benefit systems). Symbolic 
threats refer to the perceived threats that immigrants pose to the in-group’s traditional way of 
life, religious practices and so on. 
Citizens’ national identity can influence their attitudes towards the EU in some additional ways. 
While many citizens of EU member states do in fact identify as “European” alongside their 
national, local or regional identities, this does not necessarily translate to supportive attitudes 
towards the EU. The fact that many Europeans identify as such may have come about despite, 
and not because of, the spillover dynamics that were proposed by Haas (1958). Several recent 
studies have indicated a quite counterintuitive relationship between European and national 
identities among the citizens of EU member states. As I have previously noted, support for the 
EU and European integration seems to be decreasing all over the continent, and across different 
segments of the population. At the same time, however, the degree to which EU citizens self-
identify as being “European” alongside their national identity has been found to be increasing. 
Sides and Citrin (2007) argue that even as the European project is declining in popularity, 
people’s tendency to identify with both their nation and Europe has increased. For example, 
Klandermans (2003) has illustrated the presence a cumulative pattern of territorial identities 
among European farmers. Those who self-report as identifying with Europe to some extent, 
also tend to consistently identify with their national community. The more inclusive their 
conception of identity, the less strongly they identify with their community (regional, national 
and supranational/European); the stronger they identify with one of these communities, the less 
inclusive their conception of identity.   
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However, it is also well-established that opposition to European integration is often conceived 
as a defense of the national community, culture and identity against control and perceived 
infringement on national sovereignty from Brussels. Right-wing populist parties such as those 
that have recently been making electoral strides in France, Italy and Austria, increasingly 
promote nationalism and cultural concerns as being directly opposed to the processes of 
European integration. The opposition to European integration that is promoted by right-wing 
populist parties differs substantially from the Euroscepticism of left-wing parties: while the 
former opposes integration on the basis of culture, identity and national sovereignty, the latter 
does so primarily on the basis of economic, welfare-driven concerns.  
As I have previously mentioned, national attachment alone does not necessarily translate into 
anti-EU attitudes. Christin and Trechsel (2002) and Carey (2002) have shown that strong 
national attachments, when combined with moderate- to high levels of national pride, produce 
a significant negative effect on support for European integration and attitudes towards the EU. 
Once again, this effect may be mediated (i.e. strengthened or weakened) by a number of 
different factors such as consumption of news, educational and occupational skills, and what is 
known as Social Dominance Orientation.  
These complex and conflicting dynamics of European and National identities may only be 
resolved by properly theorizing how national identity can both reinforce and undermine the 
supportive or opposing attitudes held by European citizens. Scholars such as Diez Medrano 
(e.g. Diez Medrano 2003) have argued for the importance of countries’ national historical 
contexts and legacies when examining variation in Eurosupport between countries. Applying a 
sociological framework, relying on both ethnographic, interpretive, historical and statistical 
methods, he argues that nationalism, national identity and support for EU integration takes 
various forms from one country to the next depending on historical contexts and “cultural 
consciousness”. For example, he argues that British national identity is strongly influenced by 
their imperial legacy, and that contemporary German nationalism is characterised by a 
substantial degree of post-WWII guilt. He argues that a country’s unique historical legacy tends 
to inform and determine the supranational ambitions and cooperative willingness of ordinary 
citizens and politicians alike. Perceptions of uniqueness or exceptionalism, as well as historical 
grievances, can foster a cultural consciousness that is unconducive to integration and 
collaboration with neighbouring European states. Colonial (i.e. United Kingdom or Belgium) 
or WWII-related (i.e. Germany or Italy) guilt, as well as material and economic wealth relative 
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to neighbouring states and the European average, can foster an increased willingness for intra-
European cooperation and the pursuit of shared objectives (Diez Medrano 2003).  
Finally, the ways in which an individual conceives their identity appears to be decisive for 
whether strong national attachment contributes to anti-EU attitudes. Hooghe and Marks (2004) 
make a useful distinction between inclusive and exclusive national identity. They argue that 
citizens who conceive of their national identity as exclusive, i.e. incompatible with other 
territorial attachments and identities, will likely be more euroskeptical than those who conceive 
of their national identity as inclusive. They exemplify this by referring to Belgian data: Belgians 
who state that they identify exclusively as either Belgian or Flemish are found to oppose multi-
level national governance. Citizens who identify themselves as being both Belgian and Flemish, 
on the other hand, tend to support it.  
Research on national identity indicates that a person’s national identity, in terms of the strength 
of attachment to one’s nation and the degree to which identity informs decisions and preferences 
in a person’s daily life, is normally formed pre-adolescence. The consequences of identity for 
political attitudes and preferences, however, appear to be contingent on both socialization and 
political conflict or politicization. Hooghe and Marks therefore argue that identity may 
determine a person’s attitudes towards the EU when the domestic political context is conducive 
to the mobilization of nationalist, identitarian and cultural concerns. Some of the ways in which 
a country’s domestic political context can shape its citizens’ attitudes towards Europe are 
discussed in the forthcoming subchapter.  
2.6.3 Domestic political context, cues and benchmarks as determinants of attitudes towards 
the EU 
The final explanatory perspective on attitudes toward the EU and European integration can be 
referred to as the domestic political perspective. Studies that employ this explanatory approach 
seek to explain individual-level variance of attitudes towards the EU based on political factors 
such as the competitive structures and party cleavages within the domestic political sphere, as 
well as the degree to which politicians have the will and motivation to politicize EU-related 
issues. Some of the recurring themes and explanatory variables within this perspective are 
satisfaction with governmental performance and representation, the degree of politicization of 
EU issues in the domestic arena, the success of emerging populist challenger parties, and what 
has been broadly known as cue-taking or benchmarking theory. It is important to note that 
similarly to the identity-oriented perspective, factors pertaining to the domestic political arena 
are assumed to compliment or mediate the effects of evaluations of perceived economic utility, 
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rather than opposing them: “… a new line of research, drawing on cognitive and social 
psychology, challenges this either/or thinking by examining how political cues – grounded in 
ideology or in elite communication – mediate the effects of economic calculations of perceived 
economic utility and community membership and cultural concerns” (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 
420). 
Political sophistication (alternatively known as political awareness, expertise or knowledge) is 
another one of the most important individual-level factors that affect public opinion, political 
attitudes and political behavior (Highton 2009). Many of the studies that employ the domestic-
political approach rely on one or several of the following assumptions about people’s 
perceptions and evaluations of the European Union: The EU is widely regarded as too 
institutionally complex and confusing; too philosophically and geographically remote; too 
technocratic and undemocratic; and of limited practical or emotional consequence in the eyes 
of ordinary citizens.  
The aforementioned notion of insufficient familiarity with the EU among Europeans has 
empirical support. Subjective and objective measures of European citizens’ knowledge about 
European-level politics indicate that people tend to be quite unaware of, and uninterested in, 
the ways in which the EU is structured and how its policies are deliberated and decided within 
its institutions. Studies indicate that European integration is too complex or cognitively 
demanding for most citizens to grasp entirely (Hooghe and Marks 2005). The complexity and 
remoteness of the mechanisms and entities (i.e. EU institutions and their relationship with the 
EU’s constituent national governments) that drive European integration provide a poor or 
insufficient basis for individual citizens to evaluate whether they support or oppose it. This 
unfamiliarity with the EU has several potential consequences. Unknowledgeable or ill-informed 
citizens may fail to recognize the implications, both positive and negative, of decisions taken 
at the supranational level. Furthermore, unfamiliarity with the EU’s institutions, its decision-
making and power-sharing procedures, and the policy areas over which the Union does and 
does not have jurisdiction, can lead citizens to oppose the EU based on their unfavorable 
evaluations of domestic policies. In other words, conditions and outcomes at the national level 
serve as proxies for evaluating those that occur at the supranational level.  Moreover, familiarity 
and in-depth knowledge about the institutional framework and functioning of the EU are, as 
Habermas (2011) and the EU itself (Directorate-General for Communication 2011) argues, 
necessary preconditions for the establishment and nurturing of a shared European identity, and 
therefore consequential for the future prospects of European integration.  
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Additionally, EU-level politics are covered much less extensively in national media across 
Europe than domestic politics. Since people tend to be more knowledgeable about and more 
interested in politics at the domestic level, it is likely that many evaluate international or 
supranational politics and policies based on their assessment of domestic politics. In other 
words, citizens with insufficient knowledge about the EU’s institutions and the implications 
and consequences of European integration rely on cues and benchmarks from domestic political 
actors and elites when they evaluate and determine their support for the EU. An important type 
of such cues is provided by national political parties, and the competition among them.  
It is well-established that national political elites shape public support for European integration. 
Namely, citizens who support pro-European parties tend to express more supportive attitudes 
towards integration. Conversely, supporters of parties that are expressly Eurosceptical are likely 
to express more unfavorable attitudes. Furthermore, since most consequential decisions within 
the EU are made by national representatives working in conjunction, an individual’s degree of 
support for the incumbent government may translate to the European level. Research on this 
relationship indicates that supporters of incumbent government parties tend to express support 
for the EU, while those who are dissatisfied with their government will more likely oppose 
European integration and EU-level politics in general. However, mainstream parties across 
Europe have been very reluctant to introduce EU-related issues in the domestic arena. 
Mainstream parties on the centre-left and centre-right of the conventional left/right spectrum of 
electoral competition have generally been very Euro-supportive, to a much larger extent than 
both the general public and smaller parties from the fringes of the political arena. Additionally, 
European integration is multifaceted and support or opposition to it does not reliably map onto 
left/right divides. While right-wing challengers generally oppose European integration based 
on nationalism, perceived cultural and socio-political threats and broader cultural concerns, left-
wing parties have traditionally opposed the EU due to fears of it undermining workers’ rights, 
minority protections and the welfare system. 
Regarding voters or supporters of the emerging, explicitly eurosceptical or even anti-EU parties, 
these citizens tend to be consistently opposed to European integration whether or not they make 
electoral gains and achieve governmental offices. While the parties themselves may have to 
moderate some of their more extreme positions for pragmatic concerns when entering into 
government, their supporters are likely to remain as euroskeptical as before, if not even more 
so. When these parties end up as losers, however, the euroskeptic attitudes of their supporters 
are likely to increase in strength.  
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Politicization of European integration in national political arenas 
Hooghe and Marks (2009) have identified an increase in competition and conflicts over Europe 
among parties in almost all EU countries. They find that on average, European integration and 
EU-related issues have become the third most salient issue in domestic politics, behind 
taxes/redistribution and deregulation/privatization. They claim that this growing politicization 
of European integration has changed both the content and the scope of decision-making on 
European matters within member states. This development is mainly driven by elites having to 
accommodate and become more responsive towards the public’s growing Euroscepticism. 
Additionally, emerging eurosceptical parties can force the mainstream parties to reassess and 
redefine their stances on Europe so as not to lose voters to their challengers. Kriesi (2016) 
makes the argument that politicization of European integration is both time-dependent and 
dependent on national political conflict structures (i.e. cleavages). These conflict structures, he 
argues, vary systematically between three regions of Europe: Northwestern, Southern and 
Eastern Europe.  
Hooghe and Marks (2018) reiterate an earlier point of theirs; the permissive consensus that once 
facilitated a mostly elite-driven authority over integrative measures is broken. In recent times, 
European integration has increasingly become contingent on a “constraining dissensus” where 
politicization, perceived threats to national identity and sovereignty, and anti-EU populist 
mobilization all constitute constraints on the direction and scope of future integration. In their 
view, European integration has been caught in a cultural cleavage that is currently reshaping 
the structure of political conflict across European democracies. In this new reality of domestic 
contestation over Europe, questions of identity and culture are far more important cleavages 
than what Neofunctionalists and liberal Intergovernmentalists have theorized for several 
decades.  
While the EU has previously faced substantial challenges and crises, it is currently experiencing 
an unprecedented level of tensions among its citizens due to both exogenous geopolitical factors 
and unexpected developments in the national political arenas of certain Member States. The 
Eurozone crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, Islamic terrorist attacks on European targets, Putin’s 
“imperialist” aspirations and Brexit are all examples of developments that would pose a 
challenge individually, but the fact that they have all emerged in parallel within the past decade 
maximizes the threat that they pose in conjunction. Kriesi (2016)  
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Emerging eurosceptical parties and political entrepreneurs 
Following the unexpected backlash from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the failure of the so-
called Constitutional Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome (2004), Member State 
executives and the EU Commission engaged in numerous attempts or schemes to remove 
questions regarding European integration from the agendas of political parties within Member 
States, as well as attempting to limit the involvement of citizens in decision-making on and 
within the EU. De Wilde and Zürn (2012) argue that these initiatives aiming at de-politicizing 
EU-related issues are unlikely to succeed, particularly in the medium-to long-term. They go on 
to argue that politicization is a direct consequence of the increasing authority of the EU over a 
variety of policy areas, and what some regard as the EU’s “integration at any cost”-mentality. 
The well-known debates and concerns over the EU’s democratic deficit, as well as growing 
sentiments of the EU having been afforded, or affording itself ever-increasing powers with 
tangible implications for ordinary citizens, has further contributed to growing Eurosceptical 
attitudes among Europeans. These attitudes are in turn mobilized, perhaps even strengthened, 
by so-called “political entrepreneurs” from the left and right fringes of countries’ domestic 
political arena. Some of the more contentious issues that have received considerable backlash 
are the proposed “EU army”, the austerity measures imposed on poorer Southern European 
countries following the Euro crisis, and the proposed EU constitution. Such points of contention 
tend to reinforce populist notions of power struggles between self-interested and unresponsive 
elites on one hand, and a disenfranchised, silent majority on the other.  
To summarize, domestic cues and benchmarks have been found to determine individual-level 
attitudes towards the EU insofar as EU-related issues have become politicized. Mainstream 
political parties have traditionally had much to lose and little to gain from adopting anti-EU 
positions, while the opposite is increasingly the case for challenger parties from the left and 
right extremes of the political spectrum in European countries: Since the mainstream, centre-
left and centre-right parties are reluctant to politicize questions regarding the EU, the subject is 
“up for grabs”.  Satisfaction with the incumbent government and the functioning of democracy 
in one’s country is likely to correlate with support for the EU, but the changing structure of 
competition among political parties across Europe is increasingly forcing previously Euro-
supportive politicians to respond to the people’s identity-based and economic concerns over the 
ever-growing speed, scope and depth of integration.  
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2.7 Human Values, Schwartz’s theory and the effects of values on attitudes 
As I have presented in the previous chapters, the research literature on attitudes towards the EU 
is extensive and spans a wide range of different explanatory perspectives, with each perspective 
being characterised by different (although sometimes interdependent) explanatory variables. 
However, none of the aforementioned studies have managed to account for more than 20-30% 
of the variation in support for the EU. The limited explanatory power of the existing models 
presented in the previous sections may be caused by measures with less than perfect reliability 
and validity. For example, if the true relationship between an independent variable (a) and a 
dependent variable (b) is 1, and the reliabilities of the two are .7 (which is considered as 
satisfactory), the observed correlation between (a) and (b) is going to be 0.49. Moreover, the 
construct validity of the measures, i.e. the degree to which the measures capture the theoretical 
construct, is always less than perfect. Less than perfect construct validity is also going to 
attenuate the observed relationships between independent and dependent variables.  
However, a second potential explanation for the limited explained variance is that past research 
has used an incomplete set of variables. This means that important explanatory variables are 
omitted from the models, and thus that there are other, unexplored variables that can possibly 
be included in order to improve the explained variance. Basic human values have been found 
to determine, and reliably predict, a wide array of social and political attitudes (e.g. pro-
environmental attitudes, pro- or anti-social tendencies and identification with left-or right wing 
parties, among others). However, attitudes towards the EU and towards European Integration 
have not yet been explored through a value-theroetical lens. I wish to contribute to the 
scholarship on attitudes towards the EU and fill this research gap by exploring the potential 
relationships between human values and EU attitudes among respondents to the European 
Social Survey from Sweden, Denmark and Norway.  
2.7.1 Human values in social science 
In social and political life, values serve the function of guiding principles or underlying 
motivational orientations and tendencies that determine and structure people’s attitudes, beliefs 
and conduct in particular ways (e.g. Rokeach 1973; Feather 1979a; Schwartz 1994). Values are 
generally conceptualized as overarching evaluative standards or orientations which allows 
humans to identify and subsequently pursue the goals and modes of action that they deem to be 
the most valuable. Human values, value systems and people’s orientational tendencies are also 
central to much of public discourse and political contestation. Rokeach (1973) defines values 
as “… multifaceted standards that guide conduct in a variety of ways. They lead us to take 
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particular positions on social issues and they predispose us to favour one ideology over 
another. They are standards employed to evaluate and judge others and ourselves”. Following 
this logic, values are a precursor to, or predeterminant of, the attitudes that in turn direct and 
determine a person’s actions. As Mayton, Ball-Rokeach and Loges (1994) argue, human values 
belong to a distinctive and restricted class of psychological constructs that are truly 
multidisciplinary, and that have successfully been applied in research projects across most 
social and political science disciplines. Values are continuously debated against one another 
and competing interest groups tend to demand or pursue priority (i.e. in terms of policies, 
legislation and representation) for the values that they hold dear or regard as important. 
Furthermore, values are often rhetorically invoked in presidential and parliamentary speeches, 
for example by conservatives urging citizens to uphold traditional “family values”, or 
Norwegian parliamentarians contentiously debating the essence of what constitutes collective 
Norwegian values. When used as a verb, to value something means to prioritize it, hold it in 
high esteem and consistently regarding it as important. In the social scientific context, values 
refer to the standards, principles and evaluative tendencies that predetermine people’s attitudes 
and behaviours. 
Social psychologists have been studying values since as early as the 1960’s,  and some of these 
earlier works have provided the foundations for the theorizing that eventually became the theory 
of Basic Human Values (Schwartz 1992, 1994) developed by Shalom Schwartz and colleagues. 
In the psychological and social or political scientific application of the concept, however, values 
must comply with several definitional criteria. According to Schwartz (1994), a value is 1) a 
persistent belief that 2) relates to a person’s conception of desirable goals and modes of conduct, 
3) transcends specific situations and contexts, 4) informs or guides evaluations of behaviour, 
people or other attitude objects and 5) is hierarchically ordered by its importance in relation to 
other values. 
2.7.2 Schwartz’s theory of basic human values 
In 1992, Shalom Schwartz presented a theory of basic human values, building on some key 
elements derived from earlier approaches to the study of values and their relationship to 
attitudes and behaviour among individuals. The theory of basic human values prescribes ten 
motivationally distinct values, which are presumed (and empirically indicated) to encompass 
the major value orientations that are recognized and observed across cultures around the globe. 
In addition to identifying and describing the ten value types that are presumed to be universally 
present in all societies and among individuals across the world, Schwartz also presented an 
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original measurement instrument that was cross-culturally validated. In 2001, Schwartz and 
colleagues further developed the measurement instrument in order to achieve the highest 
possible degree of universal applicability and basis for systematic comparisons. 
The contributions made by Schwartz have spurred a revival of empirical research on the 
relations of values to attitudes and behaviour, both within and across cultures. This revival of 
research interest was further accelerated by the incorporation of a modified, somewhat simpler 
measurement instrument for human values in the semi-annual European Social Survey (ESS). 
Universals in the content of human values and their structural organization have been the focus 
of research for more than two decades (Schwartz 1992, 2006; Schwartz & Bilsky 1987, 1990), 
with Schwartz arguably making the most notable contributions as well as sparking a renewed 
research interest into human values and their role as determinants of social and political 
attitudes and behaviours. In 1992, Shalom Schwartz presented a theory of basic human values, 
building on common elements in earlier approaches to the study of values and their relationship 
to attitudes and behaviour among individuals. The theory of basic human values encompasses 
ten motivationally distinct value types, which are presumed (and empirically indicated) to 
encompass the primary value orientations that are recognized and observed across cultures and 
countries around the globe. In addition to identifying and describing the ten value types that are 
presumed to be universally present in all societies and among individuals across the world, 
Schwartz also generated an original measurement instrument that was cross-culturally 
validated. In 2001, Schwartz and colleagues further developed the measurement instrument in 
order to achieve the highest possible degree of universal applicability, and to provide a basis 
for systematic comparisons. 
Schwartz defines human values as “desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, 
that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person”. In simple terms, a value constitutes a 
belief, or rather a conviction, that one circumstance, potential outcome or mode of conduct is 
preferable over another. Consequently, values tend to transcend specific situations in a 
predictable manner, whereas attitudes explicitly refer to assessments of one specific object and 
its perceived attributes. Values are considered as being central to understanding and, in certain 
instances, predicting people’s attitudes and related behaviour. Schwartz and others 
conceptualize values as deeply rooted, abstract motivations that may guide, justify and explain 
attitudes, norms, opinions and actions (cf. Feldman 2003; Halman and de Moor 1994; Rokeach 
1973; Schwartz 1992, 1994). According to Schwartz’s conceptualization, the primary aspect 
that differentiates among people’s value orientations is the motivational goals that they express.  
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A key component of Schwartz’s theory is the way in which he conceives the relationship among 
the distinct universal values, particularly those that are termed “higher-order values”. The 
actions that people undertake in pursuit of each value can generate consequences that may be 
conflicting or compatible with the pursuit of other values. The incompatibility of certain values 
in relation to one another yields a two-dimensional structure dividing the so-called “human 
value circumplex” into four sections. The assumption that people’s value systems are structured 
on a “motivational continuum” facilitates the generation of systematic, coherent hypotheses 
about possible links between people’s value priorities and other variables that are likely to result 
in either accordance or opposition to the motivational goals.  
Schwartz’s theory postulates ten universal values which can be organised into four higher-order 
groups. Each of the values identified by Schwartz is based on a central goal that constitutes the 
underlying motivating factor. The four higher-order value types, the corresponding ten values 
and the motivational goals that define them are presented in the table below. 
Table 2.1 – Higher-order values, universal human values and their definitional motivations 
Higher-order Values Motivational emphasis 




Independent thought and action, appreciation for 
free choice, creativity and exploration without 
prejudice. 




Pleasure, sensory gratification; personal success 
through demonstrating competence according to 
societal standards; social status and prestige, 
control or dominance over others 
Conservation - Security 
- Conformity 
- Tradition 
Safety, harmony and stability of society; restraint 
of actions or impulses that are likely to be 
disruptive, cause harm or violate social norms; and 
respect, commitment to customs or ideas provided 
by the dominant culture 
Self-transcendence - Benevolence 
- Universalism 
Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those 
with whom one is in frequent contact (i.e. the “in-
group”); understanding, appreciation, tolerance 





The pursuit of any of the ten basic values presented by Schwartz and colleagues may result in 
either an accordance with one another, or in a conflict with at least one other basic value. 
Therefore, the theory also explains how these values are interconnected, and how they influence 
each other. Since values can lightly or strongly oppose one another on a spectrum, Schwartz 
and colleagues visually organised the values in a circular structure along two bipolar 
dimensions. The first of these dimensions is openness to change versus conservation, which 
contrasts independence and freedom of choice with conformity and veneration of traditions. 
The second bipolar dimension is self-enhancement versus self-transcendence, which 
contrasts a focus on achievement and status-seeking with altruism and giving primacy to the 
well-being of others. It should be noted that the borders between the key motivational goals are 
artificial and that one value therefore flows into the next. This can be illustrated by the following 
shared motivational emphases between distinct (but adjacent) values from Schwartz’s 
theoretical framework (see also Figure 1): 
Overlapping motivational goals between values 
- Power and achievement: Social superiority and esteem; 
- Achievement and hedonism: Self-centered satisfaction; 
- Hedonism and stimulation: A desire for affectively pleasant (sensory) arousal; 
- Stimulation and self-direction: Intrinsic interest in novelty and mastery; 
- Self-direction and universalism: Reliance upon one’s own judgement and comfort with 
diversity of experience; 
- Universalism and benevolence: Enhancement of others and transcendence of selfish interests 
- Benevolence and tradition: Devotion to one’s in-group (in attitudes, loyalty and behaviour); 
- Benevolence and conformity: Normative behaviour that promotes close relationships; 
- Conformity and tradition: Subordination of self in favour of socially imposed expectations; 
- Tradition and security: Preserving existing social arrangements that give certainty to life; 
- Conformity and security: Protection of order and harmony in social, familial relations; 
- Security and power: Avoiding or overcoming threats by controlling relationships and 
resources.  
Furthermore, people can (and indeed do) follow opposing values by acting differently and 
stressing different priorities from one context to another (e.g. social, professional or familial) 
or at different life stages. Thus, while an individual’s motivational orientations and value 
priorities often appear to be static or at least highly consistent over time, it must be noted that 
value orientations, akin to attitudes, are subject to amendments and changes. 
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The interconnections among different value prioritizations have two distinct implications for 
how the value construct may utilised when explaining political attitudes, according to Devos, 
Spini and Schwartz (2002). First, any external variable that is explored in relation to values 
tends to be similarly associated or correlated with values that are adjacent in the circumplex. 
Secondly, the associations with an external variable will decrease as one moves around the 
circumplex from the strongest positive association to the strongest negative association. The 
content and interrelations of different values, and the two-dimensional higher order value 
structure allows us to generate integrated hypotheses that specify proposed patterns of 
associations between an external explanatory variable and one or more values (Devos, Spini 
and Schwartz 2002).  
 
2.7.3 The relationship between values and attitudes 
Schwartz’s theoretical framework of universal human values has successfully been applied to 
explain, and in some cases reliably predict, the attitudes that people hold towards political 
objects. Before I move on to generate hypotheses regarding the ways in which I expect human 
values to affect people’s attitudes towards the EU, I first present some notable findings from 
existing research. Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002) found a robust relationship between the 
value types from Schwartz’s framework and people’s degree of trust in politicians and 
institutions: They predicted and subsequently found that people’s level of trust in political 
institutions correlated positively with the values that emphasize or are primarily characterized 
by a preference for stability, protection and preservation of society, its traditions and its norms. 
This relationship makes intuitive sense: Trust in political and societal institutions is a primary 
component of regime support (as discussed in chapter 2). A person’s wish to protect and 
Figure 1 - Theoretical model of 
relations among ten motivational 
types of value 
Taken from Schwartz (2012) 
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preserve the political status quo, to maintain traditions and to enforce societal norms clearly 
presupposes a substantial degree of support for the structure and character of the society in 
which they are embedded. Thus, they quite safely predicted that conservation values would be 
positively related to general trust in institutions   Furthermore, they also found support for their 
prediction that individuals’ level of institutional trust is negatively related to the values that 
stress the importance of independent thought and action, and favour change and development 
as opposed to conformity and tradition.  
People’s underlying value orientations have been shown to structure, determine or influence 
their attitudes towards other objects as well. One of the categories of socio-political attitudes 
that human value orientations have been indicated to affect quite strongly, is prejudice. This 
term encompasses hostility and distrust of ethnic, religious, sexual or other minorities, extreme 
and exclusive nationalism, preference for harsher social policies and pronounced acceptance 
for socio-economic inequalities in society. Prejudice is mainly comprised of two aggregate 
attitudes: Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). 
Because of the strong predictive power of RWA and SDO on prejudice, it is necessary to 
understand what drives these variables. In other words, it is important to understand the 
motivational dynamics that underlie RWA and SDO, which subsequently contribute to 
prejudice. With Schwartz’s theory of basic human values as their point of departure, Cohrs et 
al. (2005) hypothesized and subsequently found empirical support indicating that RWA is likely 
determined by a person’s orientation along the conservation versus openness-to-change 
dimension, and SDO by orientation on the self-transcendence versus self-enhancement 
dimension. 
Moreover, Schwartz’s theoretical framework and its methodological instruments have been 
applied to the study of negative stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes towards homosexuals 
among Australian graduate students (Heaven and Oxman 1999). The results of this study 
indicated that people who prioritized conservationist values (security, tradition and conformity) 
were more likely to hold and express unfavourable attitudes towards homosexuals and 
homosexuality. Another Australian study by Braithwaite (1997) found that individuals who 
were motivated by national strength, security and harmonious social order were significantly 
less supportive of economic benefits and welfare policies for Australian Aborigines, and more 
supportive of mining for uranium.  
Braithwaite (1997) interestingly found an inverse relationship between self-transcendence 
values, particularly those that are defined by motivations of international harmony and equality, 
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and the aforementioned attitudes that were explored in his study. Furthermore, research has 
indicated that people’s value orientations may serve as predictors of voting behaviour. Heaven 
(1991) found that individuals who prioritized the values within the conservationist higher-order 
were more likely to express intentions to vote for right-wing parties in Australian elections. 
Heaven additionally demonstrated that people who were motivated by international harmony 
and equality had a higher likelihood of intending to vote for left-wing parties. It is well-
established that certain value orientations are linked to ideology. This relationship seems to be 
The relationship appears to be particularly strong between national strength, security and order-
driven values and conservative social and political attitudes (Heaven and Oxman 1999). Finally, 
other noteworthy examples of political attitudes that may be accurately predicted by exploring 
people’s underlying value hierarchies are attitudes toward nuclear weapons (Kristiansen and 
Matheson 1990), attitudes towards the unemployed (Heaven 1990) and generalised belief in a 
“just” world (Feather 1991). 
Fontaine et al. (2008) reported that the higher the level of societal development of a country, 
the less the structure of values in the sample deviated from the average value structure and the 
stronger the contrast between two alternatively conceptualised (i.e. not arranged among the 
higher-order dimensions from Schwartz’s framework) sets of values, “growth” versus 
“protection”. These sets differ based on their relations to anxiety. Growth values (self-direction, 
universalism, benevolence, stimulation, and hedonism) express anxiety-free self-expansion; 
protection values (security, power, achievement, conformity and tradition) express anxiety-
based/driven self-protection.  
Davidov, Schmidt and Schwartz, and Schwartz and other colleagues, have produced substantial 
amounts of literature and reports on the usefulness of application of basic human value-
measurements (particularly Schwartz’s own 21-item measurement instrument) that are 
available freely on the ESS homepage. One of these reports is called “Bringing Values Back 
In: The Adequacy of the European Social Survey to Measure Values in 20 Countries” (2005/8). 
This article gives a thorough theoretical and empirically grounded introduction and overview 
of the motivations for including the Value measurement items in the ESS, the relevance of 
attitudes (esp. when they are in flux within a population) towards the EU, and whether the 
universal value orientations are indeed applicable in cross-national comparative analyses. 
The authors approach the assessment of the validity and utility of the inclusion of value 
measurements in the ESS through a variety of methods and approaches. Davidov et al. (2005) 
assess two primary sources of validity/proposed adequacy. The configural and measurement 
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(metric) invariance of the values – necessary conditions for equivalence of the meaning of any 
construct, and scalar invariance – are a key precondition for comparing value means across 
countries. They find that, overall, the ESS value items are invariantly measured across the 
examined countries.  
Homer and Kahle’s (1988) cognitive hierarchy model posits that values indirectly influence 
behaviour, through their determinant effect on attitude formation. In simple terms, the influence 
flows from abstract cognitions, through mid-range cognitions, to resulting behaviours (or lack 
thereof). In this thesis, I restrict my scope to exploring the relationship and mechanisms that 
link the first two components of this chain, excluding the potential behaviours resulting from 
the attitudes that people hold towards the EU. Specifically, I apply Schwartz’s value theoretical 
framework to explain individual-level variation in support for the EU in Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway.  
2.8 Connecting values to attitudes  
Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002) found that, as they had predicted, conservation values 
(security, conformity and tradition) had a positive impact on trust in institutions. It seems quite 
logical to assume that for a person to be motivated by preserving traditions and the established 
order of politics, norms and customs, they must regard the status quo as preferable over possible 
alternatives and developments from it. Trust is, together with legitimacy, one of the two primary 
components of diffuse political support (or regime support) in Easton’s theory of support. 
Furthermore, this study confirmed the two-dimensional structure of the circumplex, as the 
values on the opposite side of conservation (the higher order named “openness to change”) 
negatively correlated with trust in institutions.  
Schultz and Zelezny (1999) reaffirmed the relationship between values and attitudes in a study 
of attitudes toward proposed environmental policies, goals and pro-environmental and 
conservationist actions and activism, measured using the so-called New Environmental 
Paradigm (Dunlap 2008) and Thompson and Barton’s (1994) ecocentrism-anthropocentrism 
scales. They found that university students’ environmental attitudes were consistently 
predicted, across 14 countries, by their values as measured with Schwartz’s universal values 
scale. As the authors expected, the students’ scores on the NEP and ecocentrism scales were 
predicted by universalism (positively) and power (negatively). Furthermore, their 
anthropocentric attitudes were found to be significantly related to benevolence (negatively), 
power (positively), tradition (positively), and security (positively). 
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In another study, Schwartz (2010) found evidence for a hypothesized linkage between values 
and prosocial behaviour. Benevolence is characterized by concern for the welfare of the 
ingroup, while universalism values concern the welfare of all people. Benevolence and 
conformity values both contribute to prosocial attitudes and behaviour, albeit through very 
different mechanisms. Benevolence motivates actions that promote the welfare of others out of 
concern for them. Conformity values, in contrast, contribute to prosocial behaviour due to the 
motivational emphasis on avoiding negative social outcomes for oneself.  
Attitude theory (reviewed in chapter 2) tells us that people’s attitudes (i.e. evaluative 
orientations or tendencies) are formed by evaluations of an object’s attributes. Certain attitudes 
are formed based on well-informed, thoroughly reasoned evaluations of an array of attributes, 
and the degree to which these are favourable to the individual. Value theory posits that which 
attributes are assessed, and the importance given by an individual to one attribute over another 
in the overall evaluation of an object, is in many instances determined by a person’s hierarchical 
value prioritizations.  
Attitudes towards the EU can, as I have presented in the previous chapter, stem from evaluations 
of the perceived economic, identity-based or political attributes and implications of EU 
membership and integration. Most individuals will likely base their attitudes on evaluations of 
attributes that pertain to more than one explanatory perspective.  Naturally, there are other 
perceived properties of the EU that do not fit this tripartite typology.  
Attitudes are determined by value prioritizations insofar as the attributes of the object in 
question are judged or perceived to have implications that are either congruent or conflicting 
with the motivational goals associated with a value, i.e. have a relevant impact on a person’s 
likelihood of attaining motivational goals that they cherish or prioritize. In other words, values 
must be activated in order for them to have a relevant impact on attitudes. This logic naturally 
extends to political attitudes. Scholars have indeed found that basic values determine 
individuals’ preferences and loyalties within the domestic political arena. Individuals tend to 
support representatives, parties and coalitions that are perceived to be working towards goals 
that correspond with those that underlie their value priorities. In the context of supportive vs. 
oppositional attitudes towards the EU and European integration, we can thus relate the relative 
importance given to different objective and perceived characteristics and implications of EU 
membership and the “European project” to their commensurability with pursuing the goals that 
characterize each of the basic values and the primary bipolar dimensions (i.e. “higher-order”-
values). Research from the past two decades has indicated that basic values predict and explain 
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individual-level political affiliation and policy preferences more reliably than earlier decades’ 
theories of socio-economic class status or group membership. 
According to Schwartz (2006), the first requirement of value activation is a conscious 
awareness of need. Batson et al. (2007) found that self-transcendence values correlated 
positively, and self-enhancement values negatively, with self-reported levels of worrying about 
societal poverty, injustice and environmental destruction. Self-transcendence values are 
characterized by concern for the needs and well-being of others. Self-enhancement values, 
conversely, are motivated by individuals’ concern for themselves and their subjective needs, 
even if pursuing these interests comes at a cost for other people. Schwartz argues that 
benevolence values may increase the perception of need, emphatic concern and evaluative 
orientation in relation to members of the ingroup; universalism values may have the same effect 
in relation to strangers or outgroup members. Self-enhancement values are found to correlate 
negatively with the perception of need, perspective taking and empathy.  
As exemplified by studies that examine the relationship between specific values and attitudes 
towards homosexuality and homosexuals, the studies that seek to predict social or political 
attitudes with multiple rather than single value priorities are more successful because they 
account for the possible interplay between various value predictors (Beckers, Siegers and Kuntz 
2012; Kuntz et al. 2015). Previous research on values as predictors of attitudes has also 
indicated that values relate differently to attitudes depending on contextual conditions such as 
social norms and historical legacies. It is not usually presumed, nor claimed or implied, that 
values are invariant throughout the life cycle or that they exist independently of social 
influences. However, value-and attitude theory does postulate that they serve as guiding 
principles in life, and that they serve as likely guideposts for action in unfamiliar situations and 
conditions. This includes the condition of forming attitudes about new (or emergent) objects. 
Values are also more general than attitudes and, they presume, more stable or inflexible. 
Schwartz et al. see values as being shaped largely by preadult socialization and, compared to 
attitudes, are relatively resistant to being reshaped by information. Faced with an unfamiliar 
situation, development and so on, values allow individuals to pose the question: “What are the 
implications of x for the things, goals and modes of conduct that I value the most?”  
In another notable contribution to the study of how basic values can affect political attitudes, 
Schwartz, Caprara and Vecchione (2010) argue that the pursuit of basic values leads people to 
favour certain ideologies or policies over others, depending on the degree to which they are 
deemed compatible with, or conducive to, the attainment of goals. Relying on mostly Italian 
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data, they provide evidence that basic values determine political affiliation (measured through 
voting) in quite logical ways. Voters for the center-left in the 2001 Italian elections expressed 
a higher emphasis on universalism and benevolence values; center-right voters prioritized 
achievement, power, security and conformity. However, as noted by Hooghe and Marks (2009) 
support for European integration does not appear to be predictable by left-right political 
orientation; the relationship between support for the EU and party affiliation has been found to 
be structured in an inverted U-shape. Centre-left and center-right parties and their voters are 
largely supportive of the EU, while explicit opposition to integration is primarily expressed 





3 Hypotheses  
Having reviewed the concepts of attitudes and values, both separately and in conjunction, and 
presented an overview of the current state of research on individual-level determinants of 
attitudes towards the EU, and the ways in which values influence political preferences and 
attitudes, I will now proceed to generate a set of testable hypotheses regarding the ways in 
which basic human values are related to EU attitudes. To my knowledge, there are no existing 
publications that examine variation in attitudes towards the EU through a value-theoretical lens. 
Because of the apparent lack of published studies that resemble the research design of this 
thesis, I find it to be most useful to take cues and inspiration from studies that explain how other 
attitudes, especially political ones, are influenced by individuals’ value systems. The core logic 
and key characteristics that I propose as determinants of the relationship between values and 
EU attitudes, are presented in the forthcoming paragraphs. Then I present hypotheses about the 
ways in which I expect conservation, self-transcendence, openness to change and self-
enhancement values to influence people’s attitudes towards the EU.  
As I have touched on in the previous subchapter, people continuously evaluate their 
surroundings, their fellow citizens, aspects of themselves, the past, present and the future. These 
evaluations could be made subconsciously (i.e. not as a result of cognitive reasoning) or 
consciously. The resulting attitudes can be either entirely or mostly positive, neutral, or entirely 
or mostly negative. Schwartz (1992) describes values as serving a social function, first and 
foremost. The sharing and contestation of values against each other can control and motivate 
both social cohesion and progress. This social control has two basic functions. First, they 
function as” internalized guides” for individuals – similarly to the concept of principles – to 
ensure that the behaviour of group members is controlled and conducive to harmonious social 
relations, thus alleviating the need for constant social control. People typically adapt their 
values to their life circumstances; They tend to upgrade the importance attributed to readily 
attainable values and downgrade the importance of values whose pursuit is blocked or 
constrained for some reason (Schwartz 1992; 1994). This is true for most values, with the 
exception of the values that relate to material well-being and security. When the pursuit of these 
values is blocked, their importance increases; when they become more easily attainable, their 
importance decreases. As for the antecedents of how an individual’s value priorities are 
determined and structured, Schwartz (2002) argues that a person’s age, gender and education 
will often have a decisive influence on their experiences and life circumstances, which in turn 
affect value prioritisations. Age, gender and education, he argues, will determine how 
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socialization and learning are imposed or encouraged, the expectations and sanctions of their 
behaviour by others, and the need to manage different social roles and responsibilities. 
Consequently, the differential social pressures and behavioural incentives that people 
experience determine a person’s abilities and opportunities, thus structuring value hierarchies 
according to the perceived attainability of the goals that define each value.  
Actions that are driven by the motivations pertaining to a value can have consequences (e.g. 
socially, politically, practically…) that may be congruent, or conflicting, with the pursuit of 
other values. For example, the pursuit of novel experiences and challenges (stimulation values) 
will likely undermine the adherence to norms, order and appreciation for tradition (conservation 
values). Furthermore, people have the ability to prioritize opposing values simultaneously, e.g. 
being motivated by achievement in the pursuit of a career opportunity and by benevolence when 
caring for family members in need. However, opposing values cannot be equally prioritized as 
the motivational basis of an action.  
3.1 Conservation and attitudes towards the EU 
As I have illustrated in the previous sections, we can derive certain hypotheses from relating 
people’s perceptions about the EU and its attributes to the attainment of the motivational goals 
that define each value. The higher-order value type of conservation is characterized by a 
motivation “to preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in relationships with close 
others, institutions and traditions” (Schwartz 1992, 43). People who prioritize conservationist 
values more so than the opposite higher-order of “openness to change” are unlikely to favour 
substantial political or judicial reforms that may bring about uncertain consequences and 
political or economic upheaval. The higher order of Conservation is constituted by security, 
tradition and conformity.  
The complexity of the policy deliberation and decision-making processes within the institutions 
of the EU, coupled with limited news coverage and correspondingly low levels of interest and 
sophisticated understanding of everything EU-related, has allowed the EU to become 
entrenched and established as the status quo in Member States. Mainstream parties across 
Europe tend to be far more supportive of European integration (albeit tacitly) than the general 
public and have largely been reluctant to politicize the issue. While it is certain that 
Euroscepticism is on the rise across the continent, the European public is still mostly in favour 
of continued membership over the chaos that a Brexit-type scenario is likely to produce. As 
noted in the section on domestic political determinants of EU support and opposition, the issue 
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of continuing membership in the Union is generally not on the agenda of the dominant parties 
in Europe. For the time being, the primary exceptions to this common attachment and loyalty 
to the European project are the UK, which had always been regarded as the most insubordinate 
and unenthusiastic of the members, in addition to Orbán’s Fidedz Party in Hungary and the 
Polish Freedom and Justice party (however, eurosceptic sentiments in Hungary and Poland have 
not yet translated into any substantive popular support for exiting the EU). 
For EU Member States, we can regard continued EU membership and its implications for free 
trade, movement of people and coordination around common threats and obstacles as an 
intrinsic property of the political status quo. A wish to preserve the established order of society, 
including the legal and political arrangements and institutions that govern it, is a key 
motivational goal for the higher-order value of conservation (consisting of tradition, conformity 
and security). Disapproval or outright opposition to the EU, although not entirely uncommon, 
is mostly expressed among citizens who support parties at the extreme fringes of the 
conventional left-right spectrum of political contestation. Anti-EU attitudes will therefore likely 
be regarded as radical and rebellious, and thus incompatible with the pursuit of goals related to 
socio-political conformity and tradition. Furthermore, as the chaotic management and uncertain 
mid-to long-term consequences of the UK’s vote to leave the Union has shown, a pivot towards 
policies seeking disintegration and a weakening of the political authority of the EU can 
potentially have negative consequences for the country’s material and geopolitical security. The 
uncertainty brought about by such disturbances to the political order is incompatible with the 
attainment of the motivational goals that are cherished by conservationist individuals (i.e. 
people who prioritise security, tradition and conformity).   
Thus, we can derive the following hypothesis:  
H1a: For citizens of EU Member States, conservation is positively related to pro-EU attitudes 
at the individual level. 
Following this logic of adherence to the prevailing political order, including the supranational 
(European-level) dimension of law, trade and politics, the opposite should be true for non-
Member States. Apart from the countries that are actively pursuing membership, the question 
of whether or not to enter the Union has been settled in countries such as Switzerland, Iceland 
and Norway. Because the issue has been decided either through parliamentary deliberation or 
referenda, the question of whether to join the Union can be regarded as decisively settled for 
the time being. Preferential agreements and arrangements with mutual benefits, such as those 
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prescribed by the EEA and Schengen agreements, allow citizens of these outsider states to trade, 
move and seek employment anywhere in the EU.  
Conservationist individuals’ emphasis on socio-political conformity and adherence to order, 
stability and tradition can be expected to produce supportive attitudes towards continued non-
membership in Norway. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H1b: For citizens of countries outside of the EU, conservation is positively related to anti-EU 
attitudes at the individual level. 
3.2 Self-transcendence and attitudes towards the EU 
The second set of human values that I expect to influence the attitudes that European citizens 
hold towards the EU are those that make up the higher-order value type called self-
transcendence. This higher-order type is made up of the values universalism and benevolence. 
These values are defined by a motivational emphasis on tolerance, understanding and showing 
concern for the welfare of people, and promoting the well-being of others, both members and 
non-members of a person’s “ingroup”. These values are contrasted by the higher order of self-
enhancement, which is made up of achievement and power values. As noted previously in this 
chapter, self-transcendence values are more strongly emphasized among individuals who feel 
physically and materially secure. As Schwartz argues, anxiety produced by contextual obstacles 
to the attainment of conservation values (especially security) will drain an individuals’ surplus 
of energy and attention to the needs of others. Self-transcendence values tend to become 
activated when one’s own material and physical needs are fulfilled. Because of the relative 
wealth, security, liberal democratic tradition and high standard of living in the Scandinavian 
countries, the motivational goals pertaining to benevolence and universalism are likely to be of 
some importance to all Scandinavians, but to a varying degree.  
The European Union can be described as a collaborative and cooperative project with both 
supranational and intergovernmental features, in which nation states seek common interests and 
mutually beneficial conditions for members to engage in free trade, movement and coordinated 
problem-solving. Since its inception, the EU has increased its number of Member States from 
six to twenty-eight. While the Copenhagen Criteria require aspiring members to meet certain 
benchmarks of economic performance, civil and social freedoms and liberal democratic 
governance, the EU includes countries with varying levels of wealth and resources, 
unemployment rates, different varieties of capitalism and welfare regimes. The entry of 
relatively poorer countries into the EU expands opportunities for exports and trade that often 
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benefit the national economies of existing members. However, the various redistributive and 
monetary policies of the EU require a handful of (mainly older, Western European) states to 
contribute more in direct financial transfers to the rest of the EU than what they receive in 
return. Both the Scandinavian Member States, and the non-member (although being very 
compliant and supportive of EU directives and policies) Norway are net contributors to the 
EU’s budgets. In addition to being net financial contributors to the EU, the Scandinavian 
countries also benefit citizens of other EU states by providing job opportunities with high 
salaries and ample benefits. The employment of low-skilled labourers from poorer Member 
States also threatens the job security and employment opportunities of these countries’ own 
low-skilled labour force and potentially exert a downward pressure on their wages. Moreover, 
labourers from poorer Eastern European states, especially short or mid-term workers, are likely 
to be financially straining on welfare and public services.  
In the Scandinavian Member States, I expect support for the EU to be positively related to self-
transcendence values. Benevolence and universalism are characterized by motivational goals 
that concern the needs and well-being of others, even when pursuing these goals comes at a 
financial cost. From the perspective of the few, wealthier net benefactor countries, their 
disproportional contribution to the Union’s budgets are a clear cost; the benefits are not as easily 
quantifiable, since citizens benefit differently from arrangements such as Schengen and 
liberalization of financial markets. Continuing membership in the EU and adherence to the 
“European project” is likely to be perceived as conducive to attaining the motivational goals of 
the people emphasizing self-transcendence values, particularly those that constitute 
universalism. Therefore, I derive the following hypothesis: 
H2: In all three countries, I expect self-transcendence values to be positively related to pro-EU 
attitudes at the individual level. 
3.3 Openness to change and attitudes towards the EU 
Next, I wish to explore the relationship between the higher-order value called “openness to 
change” (comprised of the values stimulation and self-direction) and Scandinavians’ attitudes 
towards the EU. I have chosen to exclude the final, tenth value (hedonism) from my analyses 
for two main reasons. First, a principal component analysis (presented below) confirms what 
Schwartz pointed out in his first paper on the universal structure of values and their dynamic 
relations: hedonism shares its defining motivational goals equally with the higher-order values 
of Self-Enhancement and Openness to Change, and thus cannot be definitively regarded as 
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belonging to one value type over the other. Secondly, hedonism values are defined by a 
motivational emphasis on pure sensory satisfaction and pleasure-seeking. These goals are likely 
neither facilitated nor obstructed by EU policies or the process of integration, and I therefore 
expect hedonism to remain inactivated when individuals evaluate the degree to which their 
value priorities are aided by EU membership and integration.  
The Openness to Change-values are characterized by encouraging independent thought and 
action, seeking novelty, being tolerant of different opinions and lifestyles, and receptiveness to 
change. In the circular representation of the basic human values based on the compatibility of 
their motivational goals, this value type is situated directly opposite of Conservation values. 
This means that the pursuit of goals pertaining to one value type will conflict with the goals of 
the other. As I have noted previously in this chapter, values that represent conflicting 
motivations can still produce the same outcomes or attitudes (e.g. benevolence and conformity 
both contributing to prosocial behaviour, or far-right and far-left parties across Europe both 
opposing the EU based on different political and ideological motivations). I have already 
hypothesized that people who cherish Conservation values are likely to be more supportive of 
the EU than opposed to it (in Member States, conversely among Norwegians). However, this 
does not preclude the possibility that individuals who value Openness to Change, who are 
motivated by seeking novel experiences and by protection of individual freedom and choice, 
may reach the same evaluative orientation based on preferential assessments of an entirely 
different set of attributes and implications of European integration.  
A study by Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002) applied the theory of basic human values as a 
predictor of individual-level trust in institutions. They hypothesized that Conservation would 
have the strongest positive effect on trust in institutions, while Openness to Change was 
expected to have the strongest negative effect of the four higher-order value types. These 
predictions were supported by their analysis of data from a survey of Swiss university students 
(N=265), which found that individuals who expressed an emphasis on independent thought and 
action, novelty and receptiveness to change, were the most distrustful of institutions (e.g. the 
political system, the police, the media, the health care system and religious institutions) (Devos, 
Spini and Schwartz 2002). However, I expect individuals who prioritize Openness to Change 
to focus their attention and lend more importance to attributes of the EU that they perceive as 
positive and conducive to the attainment of their goals, and not regard it as merely another 
institution that seeks to exert control and pressures on people’s lives. Individuals who express 
these values are likely to regard EU-related supranational and intergovernmental arrangements 
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such as the Schengen Agreement and the EU’s extensive financing of academic research as 
facilitating, rather than obstructing, the pursuit of their goals. These attributes of the EU will 
likely contribute positively to the pursuit of stimulation and self-direction (e.g. through free 
travel, generating knowledge and novel insights, and multiculturalism).  
It is more difficult to hypothesize a negative relationship between Openness to Change and 
support for the EU; the motivational goals underpinning this value type are commensurate with 
many of the EU’s stated objectives and motivations for further integration in both depth and 
scope, and no policies or initiatives stemming from EU institutions are explicitly or implicitly 
motivated by restricting individuals’ pursuit of stimulation or self-direction. I expect this 
higher-order value to have a positive effect on attitudes towards the EU in all three countries, 
and thus I derive the following hypothesis: 
H3: In all three countries, Openness to Change is positively related to pro-EU attitudes at the 
individual level.  
3.4  Self-Enhancement and attitudes towards the EU 
Finally, I will examine the possible relationship between Self-enhancement values 
(achievement and power) and attitudes towards the EU. Self-enhancement-driven individuals 
are characterised by the primacy that they give to achieving acknowledgements and respect for 
their achievements, to achieving wealth and status, and to climbing social and professional 
hierarchies. As I have presented in the literature review, the processes of European integration 
have different objective and subjective implications for individuals depending on their financial 
status, occupation and so on. People who are primarily driven by money and professional 
achievements are likely to be highly attentive to potential avenues for financial investments or 
opportunities to further their career. Since the European Union is primarily tasked with securing 
and promoting free trade and movement of its member states’ citizens, achievement- and 
power-driven individuals are likely to support it; people who have little or no interest in money, 
status and career advancement are less likely to do so. Thereby I derive the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Self-Enhancement values are positively related to support for European integration and 
trust in the European Parliament. 
In addition to the hypothesized linkages outlined in this chapter, I expect the higher-order values 
to correlate differently with EU support at different points in time. Borrowing from Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) and Hooghe and Marks (2017), I intend to explore potential changes in the 
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hypothesized value-attitude relations resulting from two global events that could serve the 
function of critical junctures: The financial crisis of 2007-8, and the migrant crisis of 2015. 
These exogenous shocks would seem consequential enough to significantly alter and restructure 
the ways in which the EU and European integration is regarded as being conducive to the 
attainment of the goals that characterize the three higher-order values. The differential effects 
of the value prioritizations at different points in time (i.e. different ESS rounds) are calculated 
by performing an additional regression analysis of a model including interaction terms that 




4 Data and Methods 
This section includes description and discussion of the methodological approaches that I regard 
as being necessary and useful in order to answer the central research questions of this thesis. 
First, I present the European Social Survey (ESS), how the 10 basic values are measured, and 
the procedures by which the samples are selected. I then move on to describe the variables that 
I have analysed, some methodological approaches to determine the validity and the reliability 
of the data, and the primary analytical approach (linear regression) through which I test my 
hypotheses regarding the effects of human values on attitudes towards the EU.   
The key characteristic of comparative political studies is the aim of linking theory to empirical 
evidence through the process of comparison across time, national or cultural contexts. The data 
that form the basis of my analyses have been downloaded through the ESS’s “cumulative data 
wizard”, a tool that allows for the inclusion and exclusion of one’s own choice of descriptive 
variables, countries and rounds of the survey.  
4.1 Measurement of values in the ESS 
The European Social Survey includes 21 questions that serve to measure the 10 values 
postulated by Schwartz’s theory. Each value is measured through two distinct questions, except 
for universalism which requires three separate questions due to its broad content. The value 
section of the ESS is based on Schwartz’s original 40-item portrait values questionnaire (PVQ) 
but was shortened to facilitate its inclusion in the ESS alongside the other survey questions.  
The portrait questions, or statements, describe a fictitious person, gender-matched to the 
respondent, and respondents are asked to rate the extent to which this description is or is not 
like her or him. Each portrait describes a person’s goals, aspirations or preferences, implicitly 
pointing towards the importance of a given value. Respondents answer on a six-point Likert 
scale ranging from (1) “not like me at all” to (6) “very much like me”. The respondents’ values 
are then inferred from their degree of self-reported similarity to the particular value 
prioritizations that are implicitly described in the portraits. Based on previous research and 
theoretical considerations, Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002) state that “… one can identify the 
values that come into play when people orient themselves toward a specific construct, the values 
that are conducive to a positive orientation and the conflicting values conducive to a negative 
orientation”. Therefore, low scores on  
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4.2 Sampling of ESS respondents 
The European Social Survey has a designated Sampling and Weighting Expert Panel, consisting 
of experts appointed to set out the principles of ESS sampling, provide guidance to effective 
and consistent sample design, and to help implement it in cooperation with the National 
Coordinators of the study.  
The SWEP outlines certain principles for national sample designs that should be followed in 
order to adequately represent each national population, and to provide comparability between 
countries. These principles are:  
- The use of a sampling frame/method that provides the most adequate coverage of the 
target population; 
- The use of probability sampling; 
- The use of a design that provides a prescribed level of statistical precision. 
Outside of a general adherence to these principles, however, sample designs do not necessarily 
have to be identically constructed in each country. The choice of a specific design in a given 
country is dependent on the available sampling frames, and potential population characteristics 
that influence the cost and practicality of different sample designs (e.g. population density or 
geographic dispersal). 
The ESS SWEP guidelines define the target population for a national survey round as “All 
persons aged 15 and over (no upper age limit) resident within private households in each 
country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language”. Furthermore, the samples are 
selected by strict random probability methods at all stages. Every member of the target 
population should have a greater than zero probability of being selected into the sample. Quota 
sampling and random route techniques are not permitted at any stage. To guarantee a certain 
(minimum) level of precision and facilitate reliable comparison between countries, the ESS 
aims to achieve the same minimum level of precision in each country. The statistical precision 
of survey estimates is determined by key factors such as: 1) Sample size; 2) Distribution of 
selection probabilities; 3) Sample clustering; 4) Sample stratification; and 5) Population 
variance of the survey variables.  
4.3 Comparative analysis - Comparing fewer countries and Most Similar Systems 
Designs 
Comparative politics is a methodological approach within political science. This approach is 
characterized by the usage of systematic comparisons of two or more countries, political 
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systems, policies or any other observable political feature or entity, with the purpose of gaining 
new insights about political matters in one or more of the units of comparison. While there are 
numerous advantages associated with statistical comparison of many countries (large-N 
comparative analysis), such analyses have certain potential limitations and weaknesses, and this 
method may well be inappropriate for uncovering individual-level determinants of attitudes 
towards the EU. Small-N comparative analysis, on the other hand, allow us to consider a wider 
range of relevant social, cultural or political contextual factors that are unique to the countries 
that constitute the units of analysis.   
The comparison of few countries has been described as being more intensive than extensive, 
because the factors that are considered and analysed do not vary across a wide range of 
countries, but instead vary over time and across sub-national units within a smaller sample of 
countries. This allows researchers to probe more deeply into each individual case (i.e. country). 
Limiting the number of countries under comparison tends to sacrifice the broad generalizations 
made possible through large-N analyses, instead allowing for more detailed and nuanced, but 
less generalisable, insights to be made and conclusion to be drawn.  
Small-N comparative analyses of countries are typically studies that focus on anywhere 
between two and twenty countries as units, depending on the scope of the research question. In 
this thesis, I have chosen the countries Norway, Sweden and Denmark as my units of analysis. 
I have selected these countries due to their cultural similarity, the comparable sizes of their 
populations and the size of their economies, as well as the availability of ESS data 
(demographic, theoretical and value data) from all eight rounds for each country.  
4.4 Case selection – Scandinavian countries 
Following the logic presented in the section on Most Similar Systems Design, I will now present 
the countries that serve as the units of analysis for this thesis. I have chosen to explore the 
potential antecedents and determinants of attitudes towards the EU among ESS respondents 
from Denmark, Sweden and Norway. I have selected these particular cases due to the large 
number of comparable characteristics between them, as well as one major difference, namely 
EU membership status. 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway have a number of shared attributes that make them apt for 
comparison. In the literature on economics and political science, these countries are often 
grouped together due to their similar welfare models. Some defining features of the so-called 
“Nordic Welfare Model” are high degrees of equality, relatively high welfare spending, large 
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public sectors, active labour market policies and a relatively even income distribution. In terms 
of political traditions and legacy, the welfare states of the Scandinavian countries are closely 
linked to the political Left – especially the Social Democratic movement. In Norway and 
Denmark, the debate on potential membership in the EC was originally centred around 
primarily economic considerations. The economic questions revolved around the potential 
economic benefits, and disadvantages, of seeking membership in the EC. In Sweden, on the 
other hand, the debate has been to a larger extent been characterised by humanitarian and 
prosocial factors.  
4.5 Dependent variables – Support for further unification and trust in the 
European Parliament 
In this section I will briefly describe the dependent variables, i.e. the attitude measures, that I 
seek to explain the variation of. Trust in the European Parliament was selected as one of two 
measures of EU attitudes for two primary reasons. First, it was the only item in the ESS core 
questionnaire that directly gauged the survey participants’ attitudes towards a specific 
institution from within the EU framework, and was therefore the most direct measure of support 
or opposition towards the EU to be found in the ESS. Secondly, while trust and support are 
separate concepts, they are conceptually related. As I have mentioned in the literature review, 
Easton (1965, 1975) regards trust as one of the two key components of diffuse political support 
(for regimes or systems, parties, actors and so on), alongside legitimacy. In the ESS 
questionnaire, respondents report their trust. This variable is measured on a 10-point Likert 
scale that ranges from “0 – No trust at all” to “10 – Complete trust”.  
The second dependent variable, “EUnification”, measures the degree to which respondents 
support further European unification, or think that unification (i.e. integration) has already gone 
to far. As with the variable measuring trust in the European Parliament, respondents give their 
answers on a 10-point scale, ranging from “0 – Unification has gone too far” to “10 – 
Unification should go further”. Lower scores on this question are regarded as negative or 
unpreferable attitudes towards European integration. In much of the research presented in 
chapter 2, whether or not citizens support (further) European integration is the key EU attitude 
of interest.  
4.6 Hierarchical linear regression 
In order to examine the effects of Scandinavian ESS respondents’ value prioritizations on their 
attitudes towards the EU, I have chosen to perform a series of hierarchical linear regression 
analyses. Hierarchical linear regression is a method of statistical analysis that can be used to 
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show whether selected variables of interest explain a statistically significant amount of variance 
in the dependent variable after controlling for all other variables. Hierarchical regression should 
not be confused with “hierarchical linear modelling”, which is another term for multi-level 
modelling. Hierarchical regression is alternatively known as sequential or nested regression. It 
is characterized by performing successive regression analyses where new explanatory variables 
are added to previous models, with the aim of the added variables accounting for a larger portion 
of the observed variance in the DV. The main purpose of performing each successive step (or 
additional regression model) is to determine whether the added variables that are included 
contribute to a significant improvement in R^2 (i.e. the proportion of explained variance in the 
DV by the model).  
The following procedural steps should be followed in hierarchical regression models: 
- First, build sequential or nested regression models by including additional IV’s to each 
step. 
- Run ANOVAs to compute R^2, and then regressions to obtain coefficients. 
- Compare the sum of squares between models from ANOVA results. 
- Compute the difference in sum of squares at each step. 
- Find corresponding F-statistics and p-values for the differences in SS. 
- Compute increased R^2 from the SS differences.  
These steps should ideally be followed regardless of the software that is used. I have chosen to 
use SPSS, although STATA and R are equally capable.  
The first model (Model 1) in hierarchical regression analyses typically includes demographic 
control variables such as gender, age or education levels, as these factors have been shown to 
affect various types of political attitudes, tendencies, preferences and behaviours. In the next 
step (Model 2), we include predominant theoretical explanatory variables outside of the present 
study. In other words, Model 2 should include variables that adequately represent factors that 
have previously been found to explain some of the variance in the DV. This step allows for a 
partial replication of findings from previous research, securing theoretical consistency while 
allowing for new contributions to be made through the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables in the subsequent model. Finally, in the last step (Model 3) we can include new 
variables of interest, ideally ones that have not yet been explored. We are interested in seeing 
whether Model 3 explains the variance of the dependent variables to a larger extent than the 
previous two models. If the difference between Models 2 and 3 is statistically significant, we 
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can conclude that the variables that are added to the third model actually contribute to a better 
understanding of the variance in our dependent variables. 
In my regression models, Model 1 includes the respondents’ educational level (total number of 
years), age and gender. These variables are often included as demographic control variables in 
social and political science research, and have been found to predictably influence a wide range 
of different political attitudes, preferences and behaviours.   
4.7 Testing invariance of value measurements 
Measurement invariance refers to “whether or not, under different conditions of observing and 
studying a phenomenon, measurement operations yield measures of the same attribute” (Horn 
and McArdle 1992, 117). Multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) is one of the most 
commonly used techniques for assessing measurement invariance. MGCFA provides 
researchers with tools to assess whether a construct or measurement is invariant or not, which 
indicators contribute to incomparability across countries, and which types of statistics may be 
compared (correlates, mean levels or both). Davidov (2010) and others (e.g. Vandenberg and 
Lance 2000; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998) describe two strategies to test for invariance 
The lowest level of invariance is called “configural” or “weak factorial invariance”. Configural 
invariance requires that the same indicators measure the same theoretical constructs in different 
groups (i.e. countries or cultures) and time points. Configural invariance is supported if a 
multigroup model fits the data well, all factor loadings are significant, and correlations between 
the factors are less than one in all countries and time points. The latter of these requirements 
guarantees discriminant validity between the factors (Davidov 2010).  
Configural invariance alone does not guarantee that the relationships between factors and items 
are the same across groups and over time. This level of invariance, which presupposes 
configural invariance, is called “metric” or “measurement invariance”. Metric invariance is a 
necessary condition in order to conduct a comparison and interpretation of factors’ correlates 
(i.e. unstandardized regression coefficients or means). Metric invariance is tested by restricting 
the factor loading of each item on its corresponding factor to be equal across groups, and is 
supported if such a model fits the data well in a MGCFA and does not result in a reduction of 
model fit (Davidov 2010, 177).  
4.8 Principal component analysis 
Principal component analysis is a statistical tool that is usually applied when making predictive 
models based on numerous items. This mathematical procedure transforms a number of 
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possibly correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. The resulting, 
uncorrelated variables are called principal components. The first of these components accounts 
for as much of the variance in the data as possible. Each of the succeeding components, 
restricted by the condition of being orthogonal to the former, then accounts for as much of the 
remaining variance as possible.   
PCA is mathematically defined as an orthogonal linear transformation that transforms data into 
a new coordinate system. In this new coordinate system, the data is organized in such a way 
that the greatest variance within a projection of the data lies on the first coordinate, which is 
called the first principal component, the second greatest variance on the second coordinate, and 
so on.  
As I have presented in the previous chapter, Schwartz’s value types can be visually represented 
in a circumplex structure. Factor/Principal component analysis and Multidimensional scaling 
are the most commonly used methods for testing circumplex structures. The circular structure 
portrays the pattern of relations among the values postulated by Schwartz’s theory. The circular 
arrangement represents a motivational continuum: the closer any two or more values are in 
either direction around the circle, the more similar their underlying motivational goals; and the 
more distant any two values are, the more incongruent or antagonistic their underlying 
motivations. It should be noted that the theory postulates a circular arrangement of the 10 
values, but not necessarily of the items that characterize each value. For these items, the theory 
postulates that each item correlates more highly with the set of items that measure the same 
value than with a set of items that measure a different value.  
In other words, the theory assumes that the distinct items in Schwartz’s value survey form 10 
latent factors and that only these factors relate to each other in a strictly circular manner. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I will perform a PCA in order to confirm whether respondents’ self-
reported value priorities do in fact follow the two-dimensional distribution postulated by 
Schwartz’s theory. Does confirmatory factor analysis corroborate the theoretical structure of 
value relations? If so, we can then move on to constructing a multivariate regression model 
including higher-order value types as independent variables, with the aim of analysing the effect 
of adherence to each higher-order value on pro-and anti-EU sentiments among Norwegians, 
Danes and Swedes.  
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In this thesis, I will perform a factor/principal component analysis to ensure that respondents’ 
value prioritizations indeed correspond with the structure that is proposed in Schwartz’s theory 
and confirmed in later empirical studies of the structure and interrelation of value orientations.  
As I have previously described, relationships between values can be summarized in a two-
dimensional structure composed of four higher-order value types. One higher-order type, called 
openness to change, combines stimulation and self-direction values. This higher-order type 
forms a bipolar dimension with the contrasting value type called conservation, that combines 
security, conformity and tradition values. This dimension arrays values based on the extent to 
which they motivate people to either follow their own emotional and intellectual interests in 
unpredictable and uncertain directions (openness), versus to preserve the status quo and the 
certainty that it provides (conservation).  
Schwartz treats these higher-order types as a way to describe, and analytically apply, the value 
structures more simply. These four types are sometimes used, rather than the 10 values 
individually, to predict behaviour and attitudes (e.g Bilsky 1998; Schwartz, 1994). By 
performing a principal component analysis, the objective is to confirm that the value 
measurement items conform to the higher-order structure laid out in the theory of basic human 
values.  
4.9 Validity and comparability 
Various studies on the effect of value priorities on attitudes and behaviours have raised 
methodological issues and challenges regarding the validity and comparability of values 
measured in different contexts such as nations, cultures or points in time. Even when the same 
questions are posed to respondents in different contexts, individuals may understand these 
questions differently. The way respondents use the scale to answer value questions might also 
be temporally or culturally context-dependent. Before performing cross-national and cross-time 
studies and comparisons of values, one must guarantee that the values are invariant across 
groups and time points. According to Davidov (2010), the following three steps must be carried 
out to adequately assess the invariance of value measurements across time and national 
contexts: 
1) Explaining why testing for invariance is necessary before comparisons are done 
2) Presenting how invariance may be tested cross-nationally or across time points, and to 
demonstrate a practical application of such a test with the human value measurements 
from the ESS; and 
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3) Discussing problems that arise during the analysis of invariance.  
Davidov (2010) investigates the cross-national comparability of value measurements by using 
data from the third round of the ESS. Earlier studies by Davidov, based on the previous two 
rounds of the ESS, suggest that the data do not support full invariance of the values, and thus 
cannot simply be assumed and must be tested. Furthermore, Davidov found that values are quite 
stable within countries over a period of time of two to three years. 
4.10 Detecting multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity is a statistical term referring to a phenomenon where one predictor variable in 
a multiple regression model can be linearly predicted from the others with a certain degree of 
accuracy. In other words, multicollinearity refers to the degree to which there is a linear 
relationship between two or more explanatory or independent variables in a regression model. 
Multicollinearity should generally be maximally reduced or avoided in linear regression 
models, as it leads to unreliable or unstable estimates of regression coefficients. Independent 
variables should be independent, as multicollinearity can cause problems when interpreting the 
results of the regression.  
The severity of multicollinearity in OLS regression analyses can be indicated by the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF). This measure serves as an index of how much the variance of an 
estimated regression coefficient is increased due to collinearity. The VIF can be calculated for 
each predictor/ by performing a linear regression of each IV on all of the others, and then 
obtaining the R^2 from that regression. The formula for the VIF is:  
 
There are certain instances where multicollinearity may safely be ignored without risking 
uncertain or unstable results in a regression model. These are: 1) When variables with high 
VIFs are control variables, while the key variables of interest (i.e. theoretical variables) do not 
have high VIFs; 2) When high VIFS are caused by inclusion of products of other variables; and 
3) When variables showing high VIFS are dummy variables representing categorical variables 
with three or more categories.  
4.11 Assessing reliability via Cronbach’s Alpha 
Next, I will perform a Cronbach’s α test in order to test the reliability of the constructed items 
that serve as measures of a given higher-order value. Cronbach’s  is a function of the number 
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of items in a test, the average covariance between item-pairs and the variance of the total score. 
It is not a statistical test, but rather a coefficient of the reliability or internal consistency of 
items. A high level of internal consistency of measurement items indicates that the items do in 
fact measure what they should. Conventionally, a Cronbach’s  score of 0.7 or above indicates 
a satisfactory degree of internal consistency of items, and thus can be regarded as reliable 
(Nunnally 1978). Conversely, scores of less than 0.7 indicate that the items are internally 
inconsistent. It should however be noted that this is a rule of thumb or working convention, and 
not an absolute statistical requirement. It should also be kept in mind that the Cronbach’s  
score is dependent on the number of items composing the scale. The lesser the number of items 
in a scale, the lower the  score.  
Cronbach’s  is computed using the following formula:  
 
In this formula, N represents the number of items, 𝑣 is the average variance and 𝑐 is the average 
covariance among all pairs of variables.  
4.12 Analysis of interaction effects 
The final methodological step that I will perform and subsequently discuss, is testing of the 
interaction effects laid out in H1a & H1b. In simple terms, an interaction effect is when the 
combination of two variables produces a different effect on the dependent variable than simply 
the sum of the impact from each variable by themselves. H1a and H1b state that the EU 
membership-status of a respondent’s country will likely have a significant effect on the degree 
to which conservation values (conformity, security and tradition) positively or negatively affect 
their attitudes towards the EU. For member states (Denmark and Sweden) conservation values 
likely correlate positively with pro-EU attitudes, while I expect conservation to have the 
opposite effect among Norwegians. In other words, I wish to examine the extent to which the 
relationship between V1 (conservation) and attitudes towards the EU is dependent on EU 
membership-status, i.e. any effects of the main regression are amplified or attenuated when I 
control for membership status.   
In my case, the interaction effect is represented by the product of two variables: A dummy used 
to separate between member and non-member state data, and the relevant higher-order value 
variable (V1 = Conservation values).  
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Significance testing of the interaction effects is performed by testing whether the regression 
coefficient associated with the interaction term is significantly different from 0 (Ordinary t-
test). The second step in analysing interaction effects is to determine whether the interaction 
effect positive or negative. If the interaction regression coefficient is > 0, this implies that the 
relationship between conservation values and attitudes toward the EU is stronger for member 
states (Dummy = 1 for member states, and 0 for non-member states) than non-member states. 
Conversely, if the interaction regression coefficient is < 0, this implies that the relationship 
between conservation values and attitudes toward the EU is weaker for member states (Dummy 
= 1 for member states, and 0 for non-member states) than for non-member states. Third, strong 
interaction - or a crossover effect - is present when the value regression coefficient is negative 
in one group and positive in the other (as proposed in H1a&b).  
Finally, when testing interaction effects in multiple regression models, the predictor variables 
should be mean centred. This means that a variable’s mean is subtracted from each individual 
score. After subtracting the mean, a variable will have a mean of exactly zero while leaving its 
standard deviation, skewness and distributional slope the same. Mean centering of continuous 
variables has two primary potential benefits. First, it generally diminishes multicollinearity, 
especially between the interaction effect and its constituent main effects. Secondly, it can 






In this section I will present the results of the various steps that I have performed in analysing 
the effect of human value orientations on attitudes towards the EU among Norwegians, Danes 
and Swedes. First, I report some descriptive statistics of regarding the composition of the ESS 
data that the analyses are based on. After describing the sociodemographic composition of the 
Scandinavian samples, I report the results from two sets of ANOVA tests that show the 
differences in mean scores on the two dependent variables, both between countries (Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark) and across time (Rounds 1-8). Following this, I report the results from 
the principal component analyses that I performed in order to reduce the dimensionality of the 
21 value measurement items from the ESS dataset. I performed a second round of PCAs on 
each country, in order to check whether the measurements are invariant. Next, I present a 
multicollinearity test of the higher-order value variables, and assess the reliability of the value 
items by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. Finally, I report the results of the regression analyses 
that I have performed in order to directly test my hypotheses regarding the effect of human 
value prioritizations on attitudes towards the EU (trust in the European Parliament and support 
for further European unification).  
5.1 Descriptive results 
First, I will give a brief descriptive overview of the sociodemographic composition of the 
samples that I base my analyses on. Included are the same demographic variables that make up 
the first of my hierarchical multiple regression models: Age, gender and education (total 
number of years). This overview is useful for uncovering potential differences in sample 
composition of each country (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) that may have implications for 
the results of the analyses. For example, large discrepancies in the proportion of older vs. 
younger respondents between the countries may negatively impact the comparability of the 
data, as age has been found to influence a range of political considerations, preferences and 
attitudes (ref). 
Among Swedes, the median age of respondents is 48. The gender of respondents is equally 
distributed, with exactly 50% males and females, respectively. 53% of Swedes have 12 total 
years of education; 8.1% have 15 years (3 years of higher education), 7.1% 16 years and 5.8% 
have a total of 17 years of education (4 or 5 years of higher education).  
The demographic distribution of Norwegian respondents is very similar to the Swedish sample: 
the median age of respondents is 45 (N = 13247), with 52.6% male and 47.4 female respondents. 
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In Norway, 42.1% of respondents have completed 12 years of full-time education; 10.1% have 
13 years, 8.4% have 15 years and 8% have 17 years of total education.  
Among the Danish respondents, the distribution is also very similar. As in the other countries, 
the median age of respondents is 48. There are 50.2% male and 49.8% female respondents (N 
= 10836). The distribution of total completed years of full-time education among the Danish 
respondents mirrors that of their Scandinavian neighbours: 41.9% have completed 12 years of 
full-time education and 52.9% have 13 years in total; 8.3% have a total of 15 years, 7.8% a total 
of 16 years and 6.6% have completed 17 years. 20.2% of the Danish respondents have 
completed a maximum of 9 years full-time education, and the median number of years is 13.  
5.2 Stability and change of attitudes towards the EU: Across time and between 
countries 
In this section I report the mean differences in variance of my two dependent variables, within 
and between countries, from the different rounds of the ESS. This step is merely explorative 
and is neither intended to test my hypotheses, nor to answer my core research question regarding 
the effect of human value priorities on attitudes towards the EU. However, computing and 
analysing mean differences over time allows us to identify and possibly expand upon trends 
and time-effects, such as emergent cleavages or critical junctures, that may have an impact on 
the attitudes that people have and express towards the EU. Additionally, it clarifies the validity 
of my dependent variables as measures of attitudes towards the EU, because differences in the 
development of means on one dependent variable to another could suggest that they measure 
different aspects of the EU.  
The difference in means for each round of the ESS is calculated by performing a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). It is important to note that an ANOVA test does not give us a 
measure of statistically significant differences between the groups (rounds), only whether there 
is a difference in the means of the dependent variable between two or more groups. The tables 
below (tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3) show the mean differences of my first dependent variable, 




Table 5.1 Comparing mean differences in support for European unification over time, Denmark 
Round 2 3 4 6  
3 0.01     
4 0.08 0.06    
6 0.06 0.05 0.01   
7 -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.31*** -0.33***  
P-levels are based on the least significant difference tests (LSD). 
*: p < 0.1 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 00.01 
 
Table 5.2 Comparing mean differences in support for European unification over time, Norway 
Round 2 3 4 6 7 
3 0.10     
4 -0.07 -0.17**    
6 0.25*** 0.15** 0.33***   
7 -0.25*** -0.15* -0.33*** -0.002  
8 0.29*** 0.19** 0.37*** 0.04 0.04 
P-levels are based on the least significant difference tests (LSD). 
*: p < 0.1 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 
 
Table 5.3 Comparing mean differences in support for European unification over time, Sweden 
Round 2 3 4 6 7 
3 -0.27***     
4 -0.43*** -0.16**    
6 -0.14* 0.11 0.28***   
7 -0.19*** 0.07 -0.23** -0.04  
8 -0.25*** 0.01 0.17** 0.10 -0.06 
P-levels are based on the least significant difference tests (LSD). 
*: p < 0.1 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 
Next, I will compare the means of my second dependent variable, “Trust in the European 
parliament”. This is done by using the “One-way ANOVA” (analysis of variance) command in 
SPSS, choosing my dependent variable and selecting “ESSround” as the “Factor” by which it 
is divided. As with the previous ANOVA, SPSS produces separate analyses by country through 
the “Split file”-function. Mean differences in trust in the European Parliament are presented in 
tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.  
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Table 5.4 Comparing mean differences in trust in the EP over time, Denmark 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 0.00      
3 -0.12 -0.12     
4 -0.21**  -0.21** -0.09    
5 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01 0.07   
6 -0.32 -0.32*** -0.20** -0.11 -0.18**  
7 0.05 0.05 0.17** 0.26** 0.19** 0.37*** 
P-levels are based on the least significant difference tests (LSD). 
*: p < 0.1 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 
 
Table 5.5 Comparing mean differences in trust in the EP over time, Norway 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 0.12*       
3 -0.05 -0.18**      
4 -0.29*** -0.42*** -0.23***     
5 -0.29*** -0.42*** -0.23** -0.00    
6 -0.25*** -0.38*** -0.19** 0.04 0.04   
7 -0.29*** -0.42*** -0.23*** 0.00 0.00 -0.04  
8 -0.41*** -0.54*** -0.35*** -0.12 -0.12 -0.16** 0.12 
P-levels are based on the least significant difference tests (LSD). 
*: p < 0.1 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 
Table 5.6 Comparing mean differences in trust in the EP over time, Sweden 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 0.06       
3 -0.47*** -0.53***      
4 -0.63*** -0.70*** -0.16**     
5 -0.94*** -1.0*** -0.47***  -0.30***    
6 -0.68*** -0.75*** -0.21** -0.04 0.04   
7 -0.70*** -0.76*** -0.23*** -0.06 0.00 -0.01  
8 -0.73*** -0.80*** -0.26*** -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 
P-levels are based on the least significant difference tests (LSD). 
*: p < 0.1 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 
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The results from the ANOVA tests reveal certain similarities as well as differences between 
respondents from the different Scandinavian countries. Additionally, the mean differences over 
time follow similar trends for both support for further European unification, and for trust in the 
European Parliament.  
As shown in table 5.1, the item measuring support for further European unification is missing 
from rounds 1, 5 and 8 in Denmark. For the other two countries, rounds 1 and 5 are missing. 
The Danish respondents appear to express distinctly more stable attitudes towards the EU on 
both indicators of support. On the first indicator, Danish respondents (N=7440) are more 
eurosceptical than those from the other countries. In later ESS rounds, however, Swedes and 
Norwegians are noticeably becoming less trusting of the EP on average. Potential causes of the 
apparent increase in Euroscepticism as measured by support for further unification and trust in 
the EP are thoroughly investigated in the discussion chapter. 
5.3 Assessing the reliability and validity of the value measurements 
5.3.1 Principal component analysis of the ESS value items 
In this section I will report the results from the principal component analyses of the value items 
from the ESS. In SPSS, PCAs are performed by clicking Dimension reduction > Factor and 
then including all the items that I wish to reduce to their principal components. After selecting 
all the value measurement items, I then selected the adequate extraction and rotation methods. 
The extraction method is Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. The results of the principal 
component analysis are presented in table 5.7.  
The principal component analysis of the 21 value items from the ESS produced four principal 
components that are orthogonal (i.e. uncorrelated), each consisting of the linear combination of 
individual items that accounts for the largest variance possible. Clark and Watson (1995) argue 
that item loadings of 0.40 or above can safely be retained, while loadings of 0.20 or less are too 
weak and thus should be regarded as candidates for exclusion. As shown in table 5.7, some of 
the items are significantly cross-loading on two different components. There is considerable 
disagreement about the appropriate threshold for cross-loading items in factor analyses, but the 






Table 5.7 Principal component analysis of ESS value items 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Important to think new ideas and being creative 0.055 -0.218 -0.496 0.308 
2. Important to be rich, have money and expensive things 0.221 0.041 0.244 0.587 
3. Important that people are treated equally and have equal 
opportunities 
-0.139 -0.013 -0.696 0.001 
4. Important to show abilities and be admired 0.005 0.013 -0.059 0.751 
5. Important to live in secure and safe surroundings -0.014 0.675 0.064 0.140 
6. Important to try new and different things in life 0.493 -0.187 -0.272 0.208 
7. Important to do what is told and follow rules -0.147 0.658 -0.051 0.151 
8. Important to understand different people 0.025 0.030 -0.693 -0.041 
9. Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention -0.013 0.406 -0.148 -0.210 
10. Important to have a good time 0.752 -0.003 0.077 0.116 
11. Important to make own decisions and be free 0.220 -0.085 -0.315 0.227 
12. Important to help people and care for others well-being 0.258 0.215 -0.539 -0.121 
13. Important to be successful and that people recognize 
achievements 
0.098 0.131 -0.022 0.744 
14. Important that government is strong and ensures safety  0.069 0.533 -0.139 0.134 
15. Important to seek adventures and have an exciting life  0.536 -0.285 -0.122 0.288 
16. Important to behave properly -0.123 0.695 -0.054 0.191 
17. Important to get respect from others 0.012 0.309 -0.009 0.631 
18. Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people 
close 
0.377 0.235 -0.364 -0.067 
19. Important to care for nature and the environment -0.009 0.182 -0.540 -0.110 
20. Important to follow traditions and customs 0.302 0.574 0.080 -0.167 
21. Important to seek fun and things that give 
pleasure 
0.840 0.057 0.044 -0.031 
 
In table 5.7, the factor loadings on each of the four principal components are highlighted in 
green. Items that are cross-loading on two or more factors, are highlighted in red. In addition to 
confirming Schwartz’s proposed four-dimensional higher-order structure of values, the PCA 
results indicate which measurement items may reliably be retained, which ones to discard or 
exclude from subsequent analyses for conceptual clarity and reliable measurement, and which 
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items to include in the construction of new variables representing the higher-order values in my 
regression analyses.  
Following the PCA, I computed a scree plot in order to determine the number of components 
to retain as the basis for my multi-item variables representing the higher-order values. A scree 
plot is a procedure that visually indicates the eigenvalues of principal components, and is used 
to determine the number of factors or components that should be retained. The scree plot also 
confirms the four-factor extraction of principal components, corresponding with the four 
higher-order values identified by Schwartz.  
The next step is to perform separate PCAs for each country, in order to assess the measurement 
invariance of the value items in the dataset. I followed the same procedure as above, but with 
the “Split File” function activated to produce separate analyses for each country. The four-
factor extraction was confirmed in Norway and Sweden, but the items initially produced five 
principal components in Denmark. To mitigate this, I ran the PCA once more, but selected the 
option to force the extraction of four principal components. This procedure extracted the same 
four components, with the same pattern of factor loadings and cross-loadings as in the case of 
the other two countries.  
I choose to exclude the cross-loading items (indicated with red boxes in table 5.7) from my 
aggregated higher-order value items (Openness, Conservation, Self-transcendence and Self-
enhancement values) because it is unclear which of the higher-order values they are actually 
measuring, and to avoid possible multicollinearity. The individual items that constitute each 
constructed higher-order value variable are presented below. Excluding the cross-loading items, 
the PCA confirms the expected four-factor structure, with each principal component 
representing one of Schwartz’s four higher-order value types.  
5.3.2 Assessing measurement reliability with Cronbach’s Alpha 
While the terms are often used interchangeably, reliability and validity have subtly different 
meanings in statistical research. Measurement validity refers to whether a measurement item 
actually measures the intended attributes of a concept or an individual. Measurement reliability, 
on the other hand, refers to whether the items of a multi-item scale are suited for measuring a 
construct when their individual scores are summated.  
In this section, I will report the results of a reliability test of my value items using Cronbach’s 
α. This procedure is not a statistical test, but rather a way to calculate a coefficient of reliability 
or internal consistency. It should be noted that the Cronbach’s Alpha score does not indicate 
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the reliability of the measurement instruments themselves, but rather the degree to which they 




K is the number of items considered; r is the mean of inter-item correlations. The size of the 
alpha is determined by both the number of items constituting the scale, and by the mean inter-
item correlations. In SPSS, Cronbach’s α is calculated by selecting Analyze -> Scale -> 
Reliability analysis, and then selecting the items that correspond to a higher-order value. This 
step is repeated for each of the four higher-order values, and the analysis is performed on the 
entire data set from all three countries. The results are shown in table 5.8 below.  
Table 5.8  Cronbach’s α of higher-order value scales 
Higher-order value Cronbach’s α N (items 
Openness to change 0.762 4 
Conservation 0.680 6 
Self-transcendence 0.626 4 
Self-enhancement 0.721 4 
 
As shown in table 5.8, the higher-order value items that I have constructed from the ESS 
measurement items produce Cronbach’s α scores of between 0.626 and 0.762. These scores are 
within the commonly applied threshold of 0.6 to 0.7 and above, and we can therefore conclude 
that the higher-order value variables have a satisfactory degree of internal consistency.  
5.3.3 Assessing multicollinearity 
The next step of my data analysis is to assess the potential multicollinearity of my value 
measurements. As noted in the previous chapter, multicollinearity occurs when two or more 
predictors (independent variables) are correlated to such an extent that they become redundant 
or unstable. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for each of the four value items, 
once for each dependent variable (table 5.9).  
  




Table 5.9 – Multicollinearity assessment: variance inflation factor 
Dependent Variable Value VIF 
EUnification   
 Openness 1.13 
 Conservation 1.17 
 Self-Enhancement 1.19 
 Self-Transcendence 1.33 
TrustEP   
 Openness 1.35 
 Conservation 1.17 
 Self-Enhancement 1.19 
 Self-Transcendence 1.31 
Critical values for VIF = < 5 (Hair et al. 1999) 
According to Hair et al. (1999), the maximum acceptable VIF level is 10, but the lower, the 
better. The VIF scores (table 5.9) are all well below the conventional threshold of <5, indicating 
very low or non-existent multicollinearity between my constructed higher-order variables. 
5.4 Computing multi-item variables 
The next step is to compute multi-item variables based on the four components that were 
extracted through principal component analysis (Table 5.7). Each of these variables represent 
one of the four higher-order values presented in Schwartz’s theory. These variables are 
computed by using the following click-based commands in SPSS: 
Transform > Compute variable  
In the “Target Variable” field, I then entered my chosen name for the new variables that each 
represent one of Schwartz’s higher-order value types. I then located each of their 
corresponding measurement items in the drop-down list on the left-hand side of the window, 
except for the items that were found to be cross-loading in the principal component analysis. 
Finally, the summated value items were divided by the number of items for each variable.  
First, I computed the variable “Openness”, representing the higher-order value called “openness 
to change”. This variable consists of the items “important to.. “: 6. “… try new things”; 10. “… 
have a good time”; 15. “… seek adventures”; and 21. “… seek fun and pleasure”. 
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The second component that was extracted in the PCA represents the higher-order value 
“Conservation”. I repeated the step outlined above, including the following items: 5. “… live 
in safe surroundings”; 7. “… do what is told and follow rules”; 9. “… be humble and modest”; 
14. “… that government is strong”; 16. “… to behave properly”; and 20. “… to follow traditions 
and customs”. 
The third component represents the higher-order value “Self-Transcendence”. I computed the 
Self-transcendence variable by merging the items that were found to be factor-loading 
correspondingly: 3. “… that people are treated equally”; 8. “… to understand different people”; 
12. “… to help people and care for others”; and 19. “… to care for nature and the environment”. 
The fourth and final variable that I computed, based on the extracted component from the 
principal component analysis, represents the higher-order value “Self-enhancement” and 
consists of the following ESS value items: 2. “… to be rich, have money”; 4. “… to show 
abilities and be admired”; 13. “… to be successful and that people recognize achievements”; 
and 17. “… to get respect”.  
5.5 Computing interaction-effect variables 
After computing the four variables described above, I then created dummy variables 
representing my three target countries. A dummy variable is a variable that is dichotomous, 
meaning that it can take one of two values: 1 (presence of an attribute) or 0 (absence of an 
attribute). This is easily done in SPSS by clicking the following commands: Transform > recode 
into different variables, then computing a new variable for each country where residence in that 
country is given the value 1, and residence in any of the two others is given the value 0. These 
dummy variables are useful for computing interaction-effect variables to test for differences in 
the effect of values on EU attitudes between the three countries included in the regression 
models, and between different points in time. 
The first step before creating the interaction predictors is mean centering of my four computed 
higher-order value items. This is most easily achieved by creating an output of the means for 
each variable and subtracting the means from their respective value items.  
Next, I created two dummy variables, one for Sweden and one for Denmark, thus making 
Norway the basis country. After having computed interaction variables for Denmark and 
Sweden, the interaction-effect variables can be included in the fourth regression block, selected 
to exclude all cases that were not the target of my exploration of interaction effects (NO-DK, 
excluding Sweden and NO-SE, excluding Denmark). In addition to constructing variables that 
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distinguish between the countries, I then created dummies representing different points in time 
by following the same procedure as with EU membership. 
5.6 Regression analyses  
5.6.1 Regression analyses – Main effects 
Following the previous exploratory and descriptive analytical tests, I will now proceed with the 
regression analyses. In this section, I report the results from a series of hierarchical regression 
models performed on each of the two dependent variables. Hierarchical linear regression is 
most easily performed in SPSS by selecting Analyse -> Regression -> Linear, selecting the 
dependent variable and then entering the independent variables in separate blocks, one for each 
of my three models (Model 1-3). These steps are then repeated for the second dependent 
variable. The first block includes the sociodemographic control variables: age, gender and years 
of completed full-time education. The second block includes three theoretical variables, each 
representing one of the three predominant explanatory perspectives on attitudes towards the EU 
that are highlighted in the literature review: 1) feeling about household’s income, 2) satisfaction 
with national government and 3) allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe. The variables of this second block are included in order to control for the most 
commonly proposed sources of support and opposition to the EU; the remaining variance in the 
dependent variables, which is not accounted for as a function of either 1) identity-based/cultural 
concerns, 2) domestic political satisfaction, 3) personal economy, or age, gender or education, 
is what I seek to explain by applying Schwartz’s basic value theory.  
The third regression block (Model 3) includes my value variables, the construction of which is 
outlined above. Finally, in order to run the regressions separately for each country, I activate 
the “Split file” function and set it to generate separate outputs for each country. 
Table 5.10 provides R, R2, adjusted R2 and the standard error of the estimate. These scores 
indicate how well each regression model fits the data. For each of the three models described 
above, SPSS produces some key outputs regarding the models and how suited they are for 
explaining the variance of the dependent variables. These measures of model fit are useful when 
comparing the exploratory power of the subsequent models, and assessing the degree to which 
the addition of new variables contributes to the explanatory power of the model as a whole. 
First, a multiple regression was calculated to predict trust in the European Parliament, one of 
my two measures of attitudes towards the EU, based on respondents’ age, gender and total years 
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of full-time education. This model has an R2 score of 0.031, 0.036 and 0.038 and an F-score of 
110.366, 131.786 and 138.539, for Norway, Sweden and Denmark, respectively.  
For each of the subsequent regression models, R-square change and F-change (∆R2 and F∆R
2 in 
table 5.10) tell us the degree to which the inclusion of additional variables (theoretical variables 
in model 2 and values in model 3) increase the explanatory power of the regression model. 
Model 2 has a ∆R2 score of 0.113 for Norway, 0.181 for Sweden and 0.123 for Denmark.  The 
F∆R
2 scores are 456.125 for Norway, 825.138 for Sweden and 441.955 for Denmark, all with p 
< 0.01. The R2 and F scores of Model 3, which includes the four constructed higher-order value 
variables outlined in chapter 5.3.2, indicate that the inclusion of the value variables have a 
modest, positive effect on the overall explanatory power of the regression model.  
As shown in table 5.10, age has a small but significant, negative effect on trust in the European 
Parliament. This effect of age is also present on the second dependent variable, albeit to a lesser 
extent, and is significant for all the three countries of the analysis. These results indicate that 
age has a modest, negative effect on a person’s tendency to trust the European Parliament and 
support further European unification. Furthermore, gender is positively related to trust in the 
EP, for respondents of all countries. In the data set, 0 = female and 1 = male, so a positive 
coefficient indicates that male respondents are more trusting of the European Parliament than 
females. On the second dependent variable, gender has a significant effect in the opposite 
direction among Swedes, while it is not a significant predictor in Norway or Denmark. Lastly, 
education has a significant positive effect on both measures of EU attitudes, in all three 
countries. This is consistent with findings from previous research on the topic of attitudes 
towards the EU and European integration: the more educated a person is, the more likely they 
are to understand, and thereby support, the complex nature of EU politics. 
Next, I will report the results of the second regression block, which contains the theoretical 
variables that represent each of the three predominant explanatory perspectives on attitudes 
towards the EU. Looking at the regression coefficients in the second block of Table 5.10, 
satisfaction with household income has a negative effect on trust in the European Parliament 
among Norwegian and Swedish respondents, and a positive effect among Danes. Satisfaction 
with household income has a negative impact on support for further European unification 
among the EU citizens of my sample, while it has no effect on this DV among Norwegians (i.e. 
non-EU citizens). Satisfaction with country’s government has a strong, positive effect on trust 
in the EP among all citizens. This pattern of correlations is the same for the second EU attitude 
(EUnification). The third of my theoretical variables is “allow many/few immigrants from 
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poorer countries outside Europe”, where 1 = many, and 4 = none. In table 5.10 we see that the 
responses to this survey item are significant predictors of EU attitudes across the board: the less 
supportive a respondent is of allowing poor immigrants from outside of Europe, the less 
supportive they are on both measures of EU attitudes.    
Then I will report the results from the third regression model, which includes the four 
constructed higher-order value variables outlined in chapter 5.3.2. The R2 and F scores of Model 
3 indicate that the inclusion of the value variables have a modest, positive effect on the overall 
explanatory power of the regression model.  
H1a states that for citizens of EU Member States, conservation is positively related to pro-EU 
attitudes at the individual level. Conversely, H1b states that conservation is positively related 
to anti-EU attitudes for non-EU members. As I have noted in the methods section, “pro-EU 
attitudes” are measured by my two distinct dependent variables (TrustEP and EUnification). In 
order to assess whether my regression models support these hypothesized value-attitude 
relationships, we must look at the regression coefficients for the “Conservation” variable in all 
three countries and for both dependent variables. In order to directly test this hypothesis, I 
created a fourth regression model with new variables computed to test for the interaction effects 
between a respondents’ home country and the strength of the relationship between values and 
EU attitudes. The regression coefficients and p-values for these interaction variables, shown in 
Table 5.11, tell us whether, and to which extent, there is a differential effect by country on a 
given value on EU attitudes.  
For the first of my dependent variables, “trust in the European Parliament”, we can see that 
there is a moderately negative effect of conservation values on trust in the EP among Swedes, 
as well as among Norwegians. For the Danish ESS respondents, on the other hand, there is no 
significant effect. This pattern of correlations is similar when looking at the second dependent 
variable: there is no significant effect of conservation values on support for further European 
unification among Swedes. Among Norwegian respondents, there is a positive effect of 0.087 
with a p-value of < 0.001; among Danes there is a positive regression coefficient of 0.234. 
Although the conservation values do influence attitudes towards the EU, the effects do not 
follow the expected patterns; H1a&b are therefore rejected.  
H2 states that, in all three Scandinavian countries, Self-transcendence values are positively 
related to pro-EU attitudes. Looking at Table 5.10, we can see that Self-transcendence has no 
effect on either dependent variable among Norwegian respondents. Self-transcendence has a 
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significant, negative effect on trust in the EP among Swedes and Danes alike. On the second 
dependent variable, there is a moderate, negative effect of self-transcendence values among 
Swedes (p < 0.1) and a significant, strongly negative effect among Danes. 
H3 states that for all of my three case countries, I expect “Openness to Change”-values to have 
a positive effect on both measures of EU attitudes. Among the value-attitude relationships that 
are significant (p-values of < 0.1), Openness has a slight positive effect on “TrustEP” for 
Norwegian respondents, and a strongly negative effect on “EUnification” among Swedes. No 
other significant effects were found between openness to change and attitudes towards the EU 
among Scandinavians.  
H4 states that, in all countries, I expect “Self-enhancement”-values to be positively linked to 
attitudes towards the EU. As shown in table 5.10 below, this hypothesised relationship is 
entirely unsupported. Instead of positively influencing attitudes towards the EU, the regression 
analysis shows that a prioritisation of achievement and power has a remarkably strong, negative 
influence on both trust in the European Parliament and on support for further European 
unification. In fact, the negative relationship between “Self-enhancement”-values and the EU 
attitudes that are explored here, is both stronger and more consistent (in a negative direction) 




Table 5.10 Regression coefficients, models 1-3        
         
                       Dependent variable 
   TrustEP       EUnification 
Control variables   NO SE DK NO SE DK 
 Age  -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.023*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.011*** 
 Gender  0.176*** 0.102** 0.252*** -0.051 -0.194*** -0.062 
 Education  0.043*** 0.076*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.062*** 0.073*** 
 ∆R2  0.031 0.036 0.044 0.007 0.018 0.025 
 F∆R
2  110.366*** 131.786*** 138.539*** 18.468*** 51.341*** 58.589*** 
Theoretical 
variables 
        
 Income  -0.185*** -0.071** 0.217*** -0.036 -0.073** -0.199*** 
 Satisfied with govt.  .305*** 0.412*** 0.297*** 0.127*** 0.240*** 0.221*** 
 Many/few immigrants  -0.200*** -0.266*** -0.450*** -0.300*** -0.318*** -0.767*** 
 ∆R2  0.113 0.181 0.123 0.029 0.070 0.091 
 F∆R2  456.125*** 825.138*** 441.955*** 84.818*** 217.428*** 235.005*** 
Values         
 Openness  0.067*** -0.030 -0.002 -0.040 -0.106*** 0.019 
 Conservation  -0.105*** -0.094*** -0.014 0.087*** 0.055 0.234*** 
 Self-transcendence  0.025 -0.165*** -0.155*** 0.011 -0.072* -0.241*** 
 Self-enhancement  -0.136*** -0.107*** -0.168*** -0.197*** -0.194*** -0.133*** 
 ∆R2  0.005 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.007 
 F∆R2  15.305*** 32.383*** 20.922*** 15.138*** 25.072*** 13.328*** 
F   181.373*** 312,665*** 190.243*** 37.419*** 92.757*** 95.870*** 
R2   0.149 0.227 0.175 0.043 0.098 0.123 
Df   4.10397 4.10673 4.8970 4.8346 4.8519 4.6809 




5.6.2 Interaction effects – Differences between countries 
Regarding H1a&b, we can see that the effect of conservation values on trust in the European 
parliament is indeed different from one country to the next. In Sweden, conservation values 
have a stronger negative relationship to trust in the European Parliament, than they do in 
Norway (-0.098 with p < 0.05). On the second parameter measuring EU attitudes, however, the 
difference is not statistically significant. In Denmark, the correlations were quite different: 
Conservation values correlate more strongly with trust in the EP than they do in Norway, and 
the effect is even stronger on the relationship between conservation values and support for 
further European unification. In other words, conservation values have a more positive effect 
in Denmark, and more strongly negative effect in Sweden, than what they do in Norway. 
  
Table 5.11: Regression table, model 4 – Interaction effects: Country 
Interaction effects   TrustEP EUnification 
 Sweden, Openness  -0.184*** -0.060 
 Sweden, Conservation  -0.098** -0.043 
 Sweden, Self-transcendence  0.127*** -0.039 
 Sweden, Self-enhancement  0.033 -0.073 
 Denmark, Openness  -0.137*** 0.110 
 Denmark, Conservation  0.153*** 0.418*** 
 Denmark, Self-transcendence  -233*** -0.978*** 
 Denmark, Self-enhancement  -0.040 -0.112* 
F   366.471*** 143.063*** 
R2   0.180 0.098 
df   8.30054 8.23688 
     
Self-Transcendence values have a stronger effect on trust in the European Parliament among 
Swedes than Danes or Norwegians. Among Danish respondents, the negative relationship 
between Self-Transcendence values and EU attitudes is even stronger than among respondents 
from the two other countries.  
Openness to change affects EU attitudes more strongly in a negative direction in both EU 
countries than they do in Norway, the basis country. Self-enhancement values do not appear to 
have a differential effect on EU attitudes between the countries, except for a somewhat more 
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negative effect (-0.112 with p < 0.1) on support for further European integration in Denmark 
than in the two other countries.  
5.6.3 Exploring possible cleavages – Intertemporal stability of the relationship between 
values and EU attitudes 
The next interaction effects that I have examined are the effects of time on the relationship 
between values and attitudes towards the EU. I have not presented any hypotheses regarding 
the effects that time may have on the value-attitude relationship, but Hooghe and Marks (2008) 
and others have argued that exogenous shocks and notable events on the world stage are 
potential sources of changing attitudes towards the EU among European populations. Two 
events of this kind that have been proposed as potential triggers for growing eurosceptical 
sentiments across Europe are the financial crisis of 2008, and the migration crisis of 2015. 
Coefficients of the interaction effects of time on the relationship between values and EU 
attitudes are summarized in table 5.12.   
Table 5.12 – Regression table, model 4: Interaction effects: Time    
Interaction effects   TrustEP EUnification 
 Time1, Openness  -0.028 -0.080* 
 Time1, Conservation  0.028 -0.165*** 
 Time1, Self-transcendence  -0.069** 0.231*** 
 Time1, Self-enhancement  -0.085** -0.010 
 Time2, Openness  -0.012 -0.077 
 Time2, Conservation  0.062 -0.098 
 Time2, Self-transcendence  -0.195*** 0.357*** 
 Time2, Self-enhancement  0.009 -0.021 
F   355.541*** 108.907*** 
R2   0.176 0.076 
df   8.30054 8.23688 
     
The model is based on data from all available rounds of the ESS, for all three case countries. 
The first set of interaction variables, named “Time1 + value”, measure the changes in the effect 
of a given higher-order value on EU attitudes after the financial crisis, compared to the ESS 
rounds from before 2008 (consists of rounds 5, 6 and 7). The last four interaction variables 
measure the differential effect of higher-order values on EU attitudes after the 2015 migrant 
crisis (round 8). The basis group consists of rounds 1-4. 
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The first set of coefficients for the time1 interaction effect shows that the negative effects of 
self-enhancement and self-transcendence on trust in the European Parliament increased after 
the financial crisis of 2008. On the second dependent variable, both conservation and openness 
values became more strongly associated with support for further EU unification, while the 
positive effect of self-transcendence values increased.  
The coefficients of the second interaction variables, time2, show that self-transcendence values 
became more negatively associated with TrustEP after the migrant crisis of 2015, while they 
paradoxically gained a more positive effect on respondents’ attitudes towards European 
unification.  
Time1: After the financial crisis, before the migrant crisis (rounds 5, 6 and 7). 
Time2: After the migrant crisis (round 8). 







Having reported the results of the different analyses and statistical tests of the ESS data, I will 
now proceed to discuss the findings; the explanatory power of the variables from Models 1-3, 
whether the hypotheses are supported or unsupported, and whether the empirical findings 
meaningfully contribute towards illuminating, or ideally answering, the key research questions 
of the thesis.  
The main goal of this thesis is to contribute to the body of knowledge concerning attitudes 
towards the EU. This research topic is diverse, with scholars applying different approaches both 
methodologically, empirically, theoretically and so on. A large proportion of existing EU-
attitude research primarily focuses on  how these attitudes are shaped, how they develop and 
change over time and in response to different material or political contexts, internal (individual-
level) and external factors, and the implications of public opinion on the trajectory and future 
outlook of EU integration and “the European Project”, and whether “political choice”-
approaches are applicable when researchers are dealing with multifaceted and relatively 
complex political entities such as the European Union. I will also discuss the differences 
between the countries and try to illuminate some reasons for why values affect EU attitudes 
differently among the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish samples. 
6.1 Demographic predictors of EU attitudes 
First off, the demographic variables from the first hierarchical regression model (Age, gender 
and total years of education) all showed considerable explanatory power on people’s attitudes 
towards the EU. The effects were significant for both dependent variables (TrustEP and 
EUnification) and among respondents from all three Scandinavian countries. These findings are 
highly consistent with much of the literature on attitudes and public support for the European 
Union, which among other things shows us that attitudes develop and change significantly as 
people age. There is also a strong consensus that education tends to be positively correlated 
with trust in government, including supranational organizations and complex political entities. 
While it is customary to include these types of sociodemographic variables as mere controls 
(i.e. not as variables of primary theoretical interest), I find it useful to briefly discuss the 
mechanisms that underlie the relationships between these control variables and the measures of 
EU attitudes that I have chosen to study. This is especially because of some unexpected and 




6.1.1 Gender and EU attitudes  
Concerning gender, I found that men are more likely than women to view European unification, 
and the EU itself, in a positive manner. As I have previously stated, age, gender and educational 
level have been identified as reliable and important predictors of a plethora of socio-political 
attitudes and policy preferences. However, the findings from the literature on demographic 
predictors of political attitudes, primarily generalized trust in political institutions, are 
inconsistent: Schoon and Cheng (2011) state that “Women have been shown to be more trusting 
(Glaeser et al 2000; Schoon et al. 2010) or less trusting (Leigh, 2006) than men.” Schoon and 
Cheng largely attribute these discrepancies in the social scientific literature to methodological 
factors: different measurement approaches (single-item measures or the usage of scales), 
different sampling approaches (cross-sectional or longitudinal), or differences in researchers’ 
focus on the effects of developmental periods and divergent socialization. 
Women and men differ substantially on many other political traits, behaviours and measurable 
attitudes: studies controlling for socio-economic factors and key political attitudes have found 
that women are more likely to 1) have voted and 2) have engaged in “private” activism (i.e. 
voluntary or semi-professional engagement with social movements or interest organizations). 
Men, conversely, are more likely to 1) have engaged in direct contact with politicians and 2) be 
(more active) members of political parties (e.g. Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010).  
To reiterate the results presented in table 5.5 in the previous chapter, males reported a much 
higher degree of trust in the European Parliament than women. On the second dependent 
variable (Eunification), the inverse relationship was found: Male ESS respondents from all 
three country samples exhibited considerably less support for European unification. This 
finding, although attributable to methodological differences, are directly opposed to what 
Alvarez (2002) and others have found (albeit in samples from a different data set). How may 
we, relying on the existing literature on gender differences in a) trust in political institutions 
and b) support for trans- or supranational political organizations and entities, explain these 
discrepancies? And, consequentially, could these unexpected demographic attributes of the 
Scandinavian samples, contribute to illuminate the lack of support for my hypothesized value-
EU attitude linkages? 
6.1.2 Age and EU attitudes 
Continuing on the subject of demographic variables: on the first dependent variable, all effects 
of age on EU attitudes (TrustEP and Eunification) were significant, although not particularly 
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strong. These findings are consistent with the expectations derived from the literature, 
something which contributes to the explanatory power of Model 1. However, the size of the 
effect of age on EU attitudes seems to be significantly smaller than what other researchers have 
found.  
6.1.3 Educational level and EU attitudes 
The final demographic variable which is often included in demographic “control blocks”, 
including Model 1 of this thesis, is individuals’ total number of years of full-time education. 
This variable has been shown to be of great importance and reliability as a predictor of all kinds 
of attitudes: generalized trust in institutions, pro-social orientations, acceptance of foreigners 
and diverse cultures, interest and participation in politics, and sceptic reading of news and 
public communications. In the context of EU attitudes, particularly support for further 
integration and knowledge about the EU, education has been found to correlate positively with 
support. The tendency of higher educated individuals to be supportive of complex polities, of 
which the EU is a prime example, is also found in my regression analysis of Scandinavian ESS 
participants. There is a significant positive effect of total education on both trust in the EP, and 
support for further Unification, for all countries.  
 6.2 Theoretical variables: predominant explanatory perspectives on EU attitudes 
After having examined the degree to which the demographic variables of Model 1 explain 
variations in EU attitudes, I will now move on to discuss the “theoretical variables”, i.e. 
variables that were included in the second model of the multiple regression analysis in order to 
control for the sources of varying individual-level EU attitudes that are most commonly 
hypothesized and identified in the literature. As I presented in chapter 3, these three perspectives 
are: 
1) The economic-utilitarian approach 
2) The national identity and culture-centric approach, and; 
3) The domestic political approach (incl. politicization, benchmarking and cue-taking 
theory) 
In the second block (Model 2) of the hierarchical regression model presented in table 5.5 
(chapter 5), I chose to include a single measurement item from the European Social Survey that 
represented, and thereby controlled for, the effect of each predominant explanatory perspective 
found throughout the literature on EU attitudes (i.e. support for integration, trust in EU 
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institutions, preferable vs. unpreferable views on transferal of decision-making powers to the 
supranational level).  
The first explanatory perspective was operationalized by the variable which I have called 
“Income”, that measures respondents’ present satisfaction with their household income. The 
second perspective was operationalized by the variable “satisfied with govt.”, with the intention 
of gauging survey participants’ general support for their national government and potential cue-
taking and benchmarking effects stemming from the domestic political climate of their country 
of residence. The third theoretical variable, “allow many/few immigrants”, was included to 
control for the increasingly prevalent explanatory perspective that links EU attitudes and 
support for integration with individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants, and the degree to which 
(primarily non-western) immigration is often perceived to be inextricably linked to the EU’s 
globalist, multiculturalist and redistributive ambitions and policies.   
As expected, following a thorough review of summary articles and key contributions in the field 
of studies of public support for the EU, I found that all three theoretical variables had a 
considerable explanatory effect on both dependent variables. The direction of the relationships, 
however, were not entirely consistent with my expectations. The logic of “rational/political 
choice” theory conceptualizes EU support as a function of individuals’ satisfaction with their 
economic status. In Norway, a non-member state, higher satisfaction with household income 
correlated with unpreferable attitudes on both measures of EU attitudes. Seeing that the non-
member status of Norway is the economic and political status quo, more affluent or 
economically satisfied individuals are less likely to favour significant reforms to a system that 
has allowed them to achieve significant wealth and economic security. Conversely, individuals 
reporting lesser satisfaction with their own economic circumstances would conceivably be more 
likely to support the substantive changes that EU membership would or could entail. A notable 
attribute of the relationships between the “income” variable and EU attitudes among the three 
case countries is the fact that, while income predictably effects unfavourable attitudes/trust in 
the European Union among Norwegians, the effect of income on the second dependent variable 
is not significant. Additionally, in the Norwegian context, I expected the second dependent 
variable (EUnification) to be the most theoretically relevant measure of EU attitudes, as the 
issue of Norway’s proposed EU membership has been a highly salient political issue at two 
separate occasions. Contrary to my expectations, however, the effect of income on this attitude 
item was not statistically significant. 
88 
 
Another notable finding from this theoretical regression model is the difference in the effect of 
income satisfaction on pro-EU attitudes among Swedes and Danes. In Sweden, individuals who 
report higher satisfaction with their household income are somewhat less likely to express trust 
in the European Parliament. On the second EU attitude measure, EUnification, the same effect 
is present. Danish respondents, on the other hand, exhibit a different relationship between 
household income and the EU attitude measures: while individuals who are more satisfied with 
their household income are more likely to trust the European Union, they are simultaneously 
less supportive of further European unification. What could possibly explain the inconsistency 
of these findings, when compared to the logic of “rational choice” and the predominant 
empirical findings from the literature?  
The fact that more affluent or economically satisfied Swedes are less likely to either trust the 
European Parliament or be supportive of further unification, suggests that relative affluence or 
financial security does not translate to pro-EU attitudes. Support of the EU, particularly their 
redistributive policies, generous inclusion of poorer or less modernized countries, and 
willingness to transfer decision-making powers to a transnational community of diverse states, 
is often regarded as “altruistic” in nature. However, a lack of altruism (which will be discussed 
directly as a component of “self-transcendence” values), is not necessarily the cause of this 
effect. Swedes are already taxed quite highly in relation to other Europeans, and they are net 
benefactors to the EU’s finances by a substantial margin. This could potentially contribute to 
further unification (compared to the existing state of the “depth” and “width” of the EU” 
carrying disproportionally high costs. The Danish respondents are, conversely, more likely to 
trust the European Parliament as their satisfaction with their household income goes up. On the 
second dependent variable however, there is a strong negative relationship between the 
“income” variable and support for further Unification.  
Satisfaction with one’s national government is generally hypothesized, and empirically 
supported by numerous studies, as a reliable predictor of pro-EU attitudes. Studies have shown 
that, among the less politically sophisticated or engaged, and the less educated members of any 
society, distinguishing between their domestic political institutions and actors (national 
parliament, regional councils) and transnational or supranational polities (the European Union, 
the United Nations) is difficult. Furthermore, both for higher and lesser-educated individuals, 
cue-taking/benchmarking theory (presented in chapter 2) postulates that citizens utilize their 
assessments of governmental performance, their satisfaction with and trust in domestic political 
actors, as proxies when prompted to assess their overall satisfaction, familiarity with or support 
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for polities pertaining to the supranational arena. Following this logic, there is a considerable 
likelihood of reasonably pro-government, politically content individuals holding favourable 
views towards the EU and its constituent institutions and key actors. This positive effect of 
satisfaction with the government of one’s country and supportive attitudes towards the EU is 
supported by the results from Model 2 of the regression analyses. In fact, with b-coefficients 
ranging from 0.127 to 0.412, all significant (p-values of < 0.01), the relationship between 
satisfaction with government and attitudes towards the EU is the strongest out of all.  
Finally, “allow many/few immigrants” (… from poorer countries outside of Europe), which is 
supposed to represent and control for identity-based concerns, threat perceptions and by 
extension also tap into the degree to which national identity and in-group preferences inform a 
person’s attitudes towards the EU, has a strong, negative effect on both dimensions of EU 
attitudes. This is consistent with the findings by McLaren (2002) and Hobolt and De Vries 
(2016), among others, that found strong national attachment and concerns over foreigners’ 
influence on culture to impact EU attitudes (particularly support for further integration) in a 
consistently negative manner.  
6.3 Values and EU attitudes 
In this section, I will proceed to discuss the main and interactive effects between higher-order 
values and EU attitudes. All hypotheses described in chapter 3 were based on possible 
compatibilities and conflicts among the motivational goals pertaining to specific values, and 
perceivable, both objective and widely believed characteristics of the European Parliament, the 
EU in a broad sense, and the process of European integration. These are the findings that are 
most directly tied the key contribution of this thesis: the applications of Schwartz’s value 
theory, inspired and supported by the growing body of research on universal human values as 
predictors of social and political attitudes and behaviours (e.g. support for environmental 
policies, likelihood to vote for left-or right-wing parties, tolerant attitudes towards sexual 
minorities), as part of a model that explains the substantial variance observed in attitudes 
towards the EU among European citizens. The effect of universal human values on pro-and 
anti-EU attitudes is explored among citizens of Scandinavian countries, cases which were 
selected following the logic of “most similar systems design” in comparative politics.  
Comparing this thesis to the pioneering works of Schwartz and colleagues, it is structured in a 
similar way: values, either represented individually or as aggregated higher-order values, 
function as independent variables. The political attitudes that one wishes to explore through a 
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value-theoretical lens, i.e. outcomes that one expects to vary depending on a subject’s degree 
of importance given to one or more of the 10 primary values, are included as dependent 
variables in a multiple regression analysis, with some or all values, either individually or 
aggregated according to the higher-order dimensions, included as independent variables. 
Consistently with previous findings in the literature on public attitudes towards the EU, the first 
two models (Model 1-2) accounted for a high degree of variation in my two dependent 
variables; the relationships between the independent variables and the attitude measures, were, 
however, not all in line with the expectations. First off, Model 3 has a limited explanatory power 
in comparison with the previous two Models (sociodemographic and theoretical variables).  
In the social psychological context, values are defined as persistent motivational goals, i.e. 
decision-making tendencies that inform and guide an individual’s thoughts, actions and so on. 
Values theory and Schwartz’s measurement instruments (PVQ and SVS) have been found to 
be inextricably connected to psychological traits and socio-political choices, and to be 
ubiquitously observable and similarly distributed across the globe. Despite their apparent 
consequential nature, value prioritizations are seldom consciously decided, “self-debated” or 
even considered. Neither are their interrelations and the circumplex structure (fig x above) fully 
reliant or invariant across populations and scientific contexts. They nonetheless have proven to 
be both reliable and quite easily applicable across a wide spectrum of research topics (see 
chapter 3). When researchers have found strong correlations between a given value, for example 
“universalism”, and certain voting patterns, social policy preferences, fondness of house pets 
or any other attribute or outcome, this value-attitude (object) linkage is determined by the 
process of “value activation”. Activation takes place when, in simple terms, an attribute 
(external/visible or obscure, latent or manifest, etc.) of an object is perceived by a person to be 
conducive or unconducive to the attainment of the goals that underlie values that they cherish. 
When formulating the hypotheses regarding the effect of values on EU attitudes among 
Scandinavians, I highlighted certain attributes of the European Union, both “objective” and 
individually perceived, that would activate individual or aggregated higher-order values.  
The degree to which the hypothesized relationships between the four higher-order values and 
the two measures of EU attitudes are supported, or unsupported, is determined by the strength 
and significance levels of the beta-coefficients. All four higher-order value types were found to 
have a significant effect on attitudes towards the EU. However, the main effects were primarily 
in the opposite direction of what I hypothesized. This does not necessarily disprove the 
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hypothesized mechanisms of value activation, but may rather be an expression of the 
multifaceted nature of the attitude object (the EU) and the different ways in which people regard 
it as relevant to their value priorities. Some proposed improvements to the explanatory models, 
and ways in which the apparently inconsistent results may be clarified, are further explored in 
chapter 7.  
6.3.1 Openness to change-values and EU attitudes 
Openness to change-values were expected to be positively related to preferable attitudes 
towards the EU, irrespective of a person’s country of residence. I rationalized this hypothesized 
value-attitude linkage by focusing on some key attributes of people with high scores on this 
higher-order value (consisting of stimulation and self-direction), and some inferred 
assumptions, based on the motivational emphases and tendencies outlined in Schwartz’s 
definition of the values. I then identified, described and emphasised some attributes of the EU 
that I expected to be relevant to the motivational goals. Earlier research on value-attitude 
relations (i.e. Devos, Spini & Schwartz, 2002) found that people who cherished openness to 
change-values were more likely to generally distrust institutions than individuals who 
prioritized any of the three other higher-order value types. Nevertheless, basing my theorizing 
of “value activation” and “conflicts and compatibilities” on the wording of the measurement 
items, I, perhaps mistakenly, disregarded this source of anti-institution sentiments among 
individuals prioritizing “openness to change”. Instead, I hypothesized that individuals who were 
motivated and guided by 1) self-direction (independent action, availability of choices, lack of 
repression) and 2) stimulation (seeking and appreciating diversity, contrasts and novelty) would 
see the EU as conducive to the attainment of these motivational goals. This was clearly refuted. 
Instead, it seems that other mechanisms are at play in the relationship between openness to 
change-values and attitudes towards the EU.  
The negative effect of the openness to change-values on attitudes towards the EU suggests that 
individuals who prioritize this higher-order value perceive other attributes of the EU than the 
ones I have hypothesized as being value-relevant. In other words, the “value activation” occurs 
between different attributes of the attitude object, and the motivational goals of the openness to 
change-values, than the ones that I hypothesised. As I have mentioned, previous research has 
found that individuals who report giving high significance to “openness to change”-values are 
generally less trusting of institutions. The main explanations for this distrust is the perception 
among these individuals that institutions generally restrict independent action and thought, and 
are unconducive to change and novelty.  
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Furthermore, the low baseline level of trust in institutions of all kinds is likely to lead 
individuals who prioritize “openness”-values to see both the European Parliament, and any 
further unification at the European level, as a source of increasing restrictions rather than 
facilitation of the attainment of their goals: opposite to what I proposed, I suspect that these 
individuals see the EP and proposed integrationist policies as being unconducive, perhaps 
obstructive, to their seeking of new and varied impulses, and their opportunities for achieving 
a sense of self-direction in life (i.e. the opportunity to act and choose on the basis of one’s 
wishes or impulses, and not according to imposed laws or restrictive norms). This is likely due, 
at least in part, to these individuals’ tendency to mistrust institutions.  
6.3.2 Conservation values and EU attitudes 
Conservation values (tradition, security and conformity) were, firstly, expected to affect EU 
attitudes differently depending on the membership status of the respondents’ own country. The 
primary logic behind this assumption was that a person who emphasizes conservation (and the 
motivational goals that this value construct represents) will favour the status quo, and likewise 
be opposed to significant structural changes to the political framework in which they are 
embedded. When formulating the hypotheses (chapter 3) on how the different higher-order 
values would influence respondents’ positions on the two measures of EU attitudes, I identified 
and highlighted attributes of the European Union, EU institutions and the ongoing process of 
integration that would be relevant to respondents’ most highly prioritized values. As the results 
of the regression analyses in chapter 5 show, the proposed value-attitude linkages were mostly 
unsupported, instead indicating value-attitude relationships that required new explanations. 
Once again, I will rely on the existing literature on individual and higher-order values and their 
effect on social and political preferences, to explain the findings.  
Conservation did indeed have a strong negative effect on trust in the EP among Norwegians. It 
is possible that, as I theorized in chapter 3, Norwegian citizens tend to regard the European 
Parliament as something foreign, which is objectively true, and that they distrust (and by 
extension, oppose) the EP because it does not belong to the social and cultural sphere or status 
quo which their conservation values are applicable to. Unexpectedly, however, Norwegian 
respondents who prioritized tradition, security and conformity to a higher extent, were more 
likely to be in favour of further European Integration. This finding potentially negates the logic 
presented above and suggests that there are other factors at play (i.e. measurement of attitudes 
towards the EU activate conservation values in a different manner).  
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As the higher-order value variables consist of multiple (two or three) values that are 
motivationally related and similar, but conceptually distinct, the constituent values may have 
differential effects when higher-order constructs are used as independent variables. For 
example, in regards to support for further European unification, Norwegians may be opposed 
to the EU itself (as was decisively shown by two referendums on EU membership which ended 
with a “No”), but their prioritization of security (primarily material or geopolitical) may render 
them supportive of collaboration and unification through agreements and organizations such as 
NATO, the European Council and specially the EEA. Alternatively, the conformity values 
could extend to the international, in this case regional level, and conformist individuals may be 
inclined to support the prevailing opinions of their “national neighbours”. The fact that full 
Norwegian EU membership is out of the question for the time being, possibly counteracts the 
hypothesized linkage between traditionalist values and opposition to European integration: 
since Norway has its own set of agreements with the EU while still formally not being a full 
member, conservationist Norwegians can conceivably support further integration and express 
trust in the EP within existing frameworks.  
In the two EU member states, my analyses provided only partial support for the hypothesized 
effect of conservation on EU attitudes as measured by trust in the European Parliament and 
support for further European Unification. In Sweden, individuals who cherished conservation 
more than the other three higher-order values, were notably less trusting in the European 
Parliament. When this value-attitude relationship was directly tested (Model 4) by including 
variables representing the interaction effect of a respondent’s country on the value-attitude 
linkage, I found that the negative effect of conservation on TrustEP was even stronger than in 
Norway, the basis country. On the variable measuring support for further European unification, 
the regression showed no significant effect of conservation values. Again, this suggests the 
existence of different mechanisms than the proposed hypothesis. 
Furthermore, Danish respondents diverged from the hypothesized value-attitude relationship 
on the first EU attitude measure (TrustEP), as conservation values had no significant effect on 
this dependent variable. Regarding support for further unification, however, conservation 
showed a strong positive effect. In Model 4 (table 5.6) which directly tested the mediating effect 
of a respondent’s country on the value-attitude relationship, this was further supported: 
“Conservative” Danes (i.e. those who are motivated and guided by tradition, conformity and 
security) were markedly more in favour of further European integration than both Swedes and 
Norwegians. While the main effect of conservation values on TrustEP was not significant in 
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Model 3 (table 5.5), the interaction-effect model (Model 4, table 5.6) showed that conservation 
values still had a stronger positive effect on TrustEP in Denmark than in Norway, the basis 
country of the analysis. While this value-attitude linkage was significantly stronger in Denmark 
than in Norway, it was still not strong enough to produce a positive main effect in Model 3.  
When seeking to make sense of these findings, national-level differences (e.g. political history, 
the structure of political competition, national economic interests and international relations) 
should naturally be considered. Much has been written about the different histories of support 
for, or scepticism towards, the EU in the different Scandinavian countries. The peculiar, 
contentious nature of the Scandinavian countries’ relationship to the EU has been dubbed 
“Scandinavian Exceptionalism” by Lawler (1997), and numerous researchers of public support 
for integration and the EU often emphasize the 1992 Danish referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty as both a notable early instance of growing Euroscepticism, and as illustrative of the 
unusual relationship between Denmark (both the state and public) and the European Union. 
Furthermore, Sitter (2001) argues that “Scandinavian party competition has incorporated 
divisions over European integration to a greater degree than most West European party 
systems, but with considerable variation in Norway, Sweden and Denmark”. Overall, questions 
regarding Europe are more politicised in Scandinavia than elsewhere in Western Europe. 
Furthermore, Scandinavians are indicated to be more eurosceptic on average, than others. The 
general consensus is that, when looking at voting (including referenda on proposed membership 
and the Maastricht Treaty), Scandinavians (particularly Danes and Norwegians) are more likely 
than other Europeans to challenge further integrationist measures.  
As I have already discussed, several studies have proposed, and in different ways found 
empirical support for, strong connections between Conservation values and a generalized trust 
in institutions. This relationship was also present in the Scandinavian samples that I have 
analysed, but the hypothesised differential effect on the basis of EU-membership/non-
membership was not supported.  
6.3.3 Self-transcendence values and EU attitudes 
I hypothesized that self-transcendence values (comprised of universalism and benevolence) 
would be positively related to both TrustEP and EUnification in all three countries. Self-
transcendent individuals are motivated by the well-being of others, both loved ones and 
complete strangers, and will engage in behaviours and support policies that aim for “the greater 
good” even when this incurs direct or indirect personal costs for them. Due to its broad 
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conceptual scope, universalism is the only value that is measured by three items in the 21-item 
Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire. The results of my regression analyses of the value-
attitude relations discredit, or at least prompt a significant re-evaluation, of the ways in which 
self-transcendent values are related to Euroscepticism and Eurosupport. Among the correlations 
which where statistically significant, all had the opposite effect of what I had predicted. This 
suggests that the relationship between self-transcendence and EU attitudes is governed by 
different mechanisms than the ones that I originally proposed. Results from the regression 
analyses indicate that altruistic individuals do not perceive the European Union and the process 
of European integration as a socioeconomic “levelling agent”, or as a “force for the greater 
good”, despite such ambitions being explicitly stated and implicitly grounded at various stages 
of the “European Project”. Rather, it is quite the opposite: Self-transcendent individuals, who 
prioritize benevolence and universalism over all other values, are considerably less favourable 
in their attitudes towards the European Union in all of the countries where the data produced a 
significant effect.  
One possible source of this effect is related to the rationale behind traditional left-wing 
opposition to the EU in the Scandinavian countries, beginning in the early stages of European 
Community (EC) expansion. In a study of the effect of the 10 values on voting and self-reported 
ideological orientation on a conventional left-right spectrum, in 16 countries across 5 
continents, Davidov, Schultz and Schwartz (2008) provided an interesting insight: The values 
that most robustly predict people’s ideological placement were 1) Universalism, which was 
most strongly correlated with center-left to left policy support, party affiliation, voting history 
and prospective voting in upcoming national elections, and; 2) Security, the value most strongly 
associated with center-right to right-wing ideological self-placement and political choices. In 
my analysis of the Scandinavian ESS data, the respective higher-order values (conservation and 
self-transcendence) containing these two, supposedly opposed and antithetical values, have 
quite similar negative effects on attitudes towards the EU.  
Additionally, my hypothesis stated that the effect of self-transcendence on pro-EU attitudes 
would be observed in all three countries; a respondents’ country of residence and its EU 
membership status does not make a notable difference in the degree to which highly self-
transcendent individuals see the EU as commensurate with their priorities. As the main effects 
in  Model 3 (table 5.10) shows, Norwegian individuals who prioritise these values  
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6.3.4 Self-Enhancement values and EU attitudes 
Individuals who reported giving priority to self-enhancement values (achievement and power) 
are driven by their personal accomplishments, generally in direct comparison to others around 
them. Their actions and choices are motivated by status, respect and acknowledgement of their 
efforts or achievements by relevant others (i.e. members of an in-group). I hypothesized that 
people who are motivated primarily by personal accomplishments (i.e. financial gains, 
improving career and employment status, seeking responsibility and authority over others), are 
likely to be supportive of the EU. For all the politically sensitive, contentious questions of 
sovereignty, multiculturalism and the “democratic deficit” within the EU, the Union remains at 
its core a primarily economic project. To support the EU is, necessarily, to support the free trade 
of people, goods, services and financial assets. The people who stand to gain the most from 
liberalized intra-EU trade conditions (business executives, investors, highly skilled 
professionals and white-collar workers), are more likely to give high priority to self-
enhancement values than other social and professional groups, because self-enhancement is 
likely to stimulate competitiveness and be a required attribute of the individuals who hold these 
top positions.  
The literature on EU support suggests that, alongside the increasing focus on topics like national 
identity and politicization, perceived economic rationality still plays an important role in 
explaining the variance in support for the EU across both member and non-member states in 
Europe. As I have presented in the previous chapter, however, the Scandinavian ESS data do 
not support this hypothesized relationship. Rather, the findings suggest that individuals who 
cherish self-enhancement are less likely to have supportive or preferable attitudes towards the 
EU. A possible explanation for this relationship is what can be referred to as a “big fish in a 
little pond”-mentality. Self-enhancement values are characterized by a focus on status and 
importance vis-à-vis others, and by acknowledgement of one’s achievements and positive 
qualities. This is reflective of a two-way comparison process. The individuals compare 
themselves to others, and others again compare When hypothesizing about the relationship 
between self-enhancement values and attitudes towards the EU, I possibly overlooked a critical 
dynamic within the relationship between this higher-order value type and attitudes towards the 
EU: 
Highly achievement-and power-driven individuals are likely to measure their own success, and 
by extension their attainment of value-relevant motivational goals, in relation to a limited in-
group such as a social network or an academic field. It remains true that the EU and the process 
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of integration, through its liberalizing and homogenizing of markets, increases the sum of 
employment and investment opportunities for citizens of participating countries (EU member 
states and the EEA countries). However, the integration of different markets and sectors of 
national economies possibly dilutes the relative importance of the achievements of the 
individuals that sit at the top of national hierarchies. An individual who is motivated by a wish 
to dominate and be considered as the “best in the business” within their profession, will possibly 
see their relative status or importance dwindle as the total number of relevant competitors 
increases. A person who is motivated largely by relative status and recognition of their abilities 
in relation to others, will likely find it easier to attain their key motivational goals (recognition 
of achievements, status and respect, power over others) within existing, well-defined national 
hierarchies than in the larger and more uncertain professional fields, economic sectors and 
hierarchies that EU policies and European integration produces. It is easier and incurs fewer, 
lesser costs for a self-enhancement-driven person to retain their position in a hierarchy by 
restricting access for competitors, than by constantly improving their skills or their product, and 
by applying energy and resources in order to remain ahead. In a simple metaphor, the relative 
size of the “fish” decreases as the “pond” increases. The more important it is for the “fish” to 
be bigger than its competitors (i.e. a relevant in-group or professional field), the more likely 
they are to oppose any growth of their “pond”.  
Additionally, it is possible that the activities and ambitions of the EU that are not related to 
liberalization and homogenization of markets, trade policies and so on, are regarded less 
favourably and possibly unconducive to attainment of key motivational goals by those who give 
high importance to self-enhancement values. Schwartz’s theory posits that, within the two-
dimensional circumplex structure of value interrelations, an individual who scores high on one 
higher-order pole will reliably score lower on the opposite pole. Thus, a person who is primarily 
motivated by self-enhancement is likely to give limited importance to self-transcendence values 
(universalism and benevolence). Solidarity, economic redistribution or inter-European 
promotion of democratic values are therefore likely to be of little motivational importance for 
individuals who score highly on self-enhancement values and are possibly regarded as contrary 
to the motivational goals of such people.  
As with the other three value types, the effect of self-enhancement values on EU support 
appears to be mediated by uncertain factors that should be studied further in order to definitely 
establish how attitudes towards the EU may be predicted and shaped by an individual’s value 
priorities. The findings of this thesis suggest that, based on available data from 8 rounds of the 
98 
 
ESS, Scandinavians who are highly self-enhancing (i.e. highly motivated by achievement and 
power values) are likely to oppose, rather than support, the EU.  
 
7 Limitations and directions for future research 
Finally, I will address some key limitations of this thesis. Throughout the thesis, I have 
presented some theoretical and empirical contributions to the research on attitudes towards the 
EU among Scandinavians. In addition to the commonly researched sociodemographic and 
theoretical predictor variables, I have investigated the effects human values as described by 
Schwartz (i.e. 1992; 1994). By analysing data from 8 rounds of the European Social Survey, 
from Norway, Sweden and Denmark, I have found some strong relationships between value 
prioritizations and attitudes towards the EU and further European integration. However, the 
values did not impact the EU attitudes in the ways that I hypothesised; the value activation, 
while shown to clearly be present, apparently takes place between different attributes of the EU 
and different motivational goals and emphases than the ones that I initially thought to be 
present. However, I still contend that I have illustrated that the theory of basic human values 
and the value-prioritisation-data have a certain degree of explanatory power on Scandinavians’ 
attitudes towards the EU. 
As I have noted in the preceding chapters, there are several limitations in the way that this 
project was planned, and the research design, that restrict the findings and the conclusions that 
they allow for. A primary example of such limitations is the insufficiency of the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the “attitude objects”; support for further European 
integration, and trust in the European Parliament, hardly exhaust the scope of the perceived and 
objective attributes of the EU that people evaluate when forming their attitude towards the EU. 
As Boomgaarden et al. (2011) have stated - given the complex nature of the European 
integration project – it would be naïve to speak about EU attitudes as a one-dimensional 
concept. In future research projects, I think it would be beneficial to use a wider selection of, 
preferably multi-dimensional, measures of EU attitudes. For example, surveys that gauge 
Europeans’ attitudes towards specific EU-level policies, proposed developments and 
institutional arrangements can probably provide a better, more nuanced set of dependent 
variables, that in turn would allow for better specified hypotheses regarding the value 
activating-attributes of the EU.  
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I decided to construct new variables based on the adjacent and conceptually related higher-
order values. The primary benefit of this approach, I argued, was the ability to rely on previously 
established patterns of relationships between higher order-values and political attitudes such as 
generalised trust in institutions, left-right party preferences and support for environmental 
policies, when deriving new hypotheses regarded conceptually related attitudes towards other 
political objects (the EU and European integration). However, seeing that the constructed 
variables did not affect attitudes towards the EU in the hypothesised direction, an alternative 
approach should be considered. For example, the relationships between the 10 basic human 
values and the applied (or additional, alternative) measures of EU attitudes could be explored 
individually. This would allow us to 1) see which of the independent values have the greatest 
effect (before specifying the models further and then strengthening the theoretical validity by 
examining then in conjunction as per the circumplex higher-order structure) and 2) draw certain 
conclusions regarding the “value profile”, i.e. the value-hierarchical composition, of the 
average eurosupportive and eurosceptic Scandinavian citizen. This knowledge, in turn, would 
be valuable for policy-makers, educators and journalists who wish to improve the popular 
impact of their communication of EU-related news, matters and policy proposals.  
Furthermore, the relationship between values and attitudes towards the EU is likely to be 
mediated by various factors, i.e. intermediary attitudes or attitude objects. Future studies on the 
subject of values and attitudes towards the EU should consider the differential ways in which 
value-related goals manifest among different people in different contexts. For example, it is 
conceivable that people’s party preferences colour their support for different EU policies (i.e. 
social policies, economic redistributive arrangements and free movement of people). 
Additionally, more robust relationships and consistent patterns between value prioritisations 
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